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18 May 1964

Briefly Noted

North Korea: Economic Retrenchment 1964.

With considerable help from the USSR, North Korea achieved an impressive over-all record of economic development after the Korean War and into 1962. But standards of living for the people have remained low during the whole period. It does not appear likely that Soviet aid will continue on the original scale (North Korea has sided with China in the Communist conflict) and, while Peking can divert sizeable amounts of consumer goods to its small neighbor, it cannot fill the need for heavy industrial equipment. North Korea will probably have to rely largely on her own capabilities in the next years to develop the extensive natural resources of the country. However, Communist economic planning has been characterized by many weaknesses which North Korea has not escaped, such as:

- 1) misplaced priorities and ill-advised allocation of manpower and material resources;
- 2) belated adjustment of plans to bring goals more nearly into balance with production capability, induced to a large extent by subordinating economic reality to political aspirations; and
- 3) generally unrealistic increases in production goals, presumably to pressure workers and managers to superhuman effort as well as to create an atmosphere of abundance for the people.

Facts, problems and errors of North Korean economic planning are set forth in an unclassified attachment "Economic Retrenchment for North Korea in 1964" (prepared in late October 1963). An objective analysis by experts, many of the facts and conclusions will interest those individuals, officials and governments who believe the Communist economic model might be one to emulate, or who hope to gain through some economic relationship with (Asian) Communist countries.

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The Czechoslovak Economy Declines Further

A "Briefly Noted" item in BPG No. 133 of 6 Apr 64 pointed out that Czechoslovakia exemplifies the stagnation of an advanced and developed society when it is saddled by Communism. A new report reveals that the Czechoslovak economy not only stagnated under the first years of Communist control, but has now gone into a rather serious decline.

The annual "Economic Survey of Europe" by the UN Economic Commission for Europe shows that not only did Western European income growth outpace Eastern Europe in 1963, but that Czechoslovak performance was the worst in the entire area. Western European national income as a whole maintained the same 3.5 percent expansion rate in 1963 as in 1962. After claiming 6 percent annual increases in the years 1960 and 1961, the Eastern Europe increase in income level slowed to 3 percent in the years 1962 and 1963, and even the latter is questionable -- the Albanians claimed an 8% increase in 1963! However, the income level of Czechoslovakia increased by only 1 percent in 1962, and declined by 4 percent in 1963. Thus, the planned Czechoslovak rise of 1½ percent in 1964, even if achieved, would leave their level still below that of 1961.

BPG No. 134 of 10 Feb 64 (Item No. 741) pointed out that the good reputation and prosperity which once-free Czechoslovakia had built up before Communist seizure, were ruthlessly exploited by the Soviets as a facade under which to covertly extend Soviet influence and subversion abroad. The reversal of the Czechoslovak economic growth from one of the highest in Europe to the very lowest is telling evidence of how the Czechoslovaks and other satellite peoples are being made to pay the bills for Moscow's predatory activities.

The statistical revelations of the UN report spring to life vividly in an extraordinary six-page feature, "Kafka's Nightmare Comes True," in The Reporter magazine of 7 May 64. This article was done by a free-lance writer specializing on Eastern Europe. He based the piece on a recent trip through Czechoslovakia, in the course of which he gained a remarkable insight into the politico-economic turmoil there - a fact born out by the uproar which the article has caused in U.S. Czechoslovak circles. A full reproduction of the article will be found in the unclassified attachments (also reproduced in the 6 May issue of Press Comment). It should have considerable appeal among knowledgeable audiences in Latin America and Africa.

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Briefly Noted

13 May 1964

Indian Reply to Chicom Note on Tibet

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs has made public its reply to the 23 March Chinese People's Republic (CPR) protest that the Indian government had interfered in China's internal affairs by "continuing to support Tibetan rebels who take refuge in India." The Indian note describes the Chicom allegations as "false and malicious," and points out that the 1959 Tibetan rebellion "was not something engineered by the Indian government but a spontaneous and inevitable reaction of the unfortunate people of Tibet against the attempt by the Chinese government to extinguish by brute force the autonomy of Tibet." We quote the Indian note, emphasizing that its source is a neutralist government committed neither to the East nor the West, as an additional indication of how the Chicom treat minorities and how they not only try to force their will on defenseless peoples, but object when anyone suggests it is not their God-given right to do so. [See Briefly Noted on Tibet

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(Briefly Noted)

- June Afro-Asian Islamic Conference, Preparatory Meeting, Djak. 1964--full conference in late 1964, early 65.
- 5 June Sec. George Marshall proposes European Recovery Program ("Marshall Plan") in Harvard speech. (Sovs prevent Poland and Czechoslovakia from participating.) 1947
- 11 June Marshal Tukhachevsky and 7 other top Red Army Generals arrested, tried secretly and executed. 1937
- 14 June China-Russia sign second "Unequal Treaty," Tientsin, 1858.
- 15 June USSR occupies Lithuania 15 June 1940, Estonia and Latvia 17 June 1940.
- 17 June German Day of Unity (W Ger) commemorating E Ger worker /youth riots 16-17 June 1953 quelled by Sov troops.
- 17 June Hungary announces trial, execution of Imre Nagy, 1958.
- 19 June Tibet: International Commission of Jurists charges Chicom with genocide, 1960.
- 29 June Ruthenia (formerly part of Czechoslovakia) ceded to USSR, 1945)
- 1 July Communist Party of China founded. 1921
- 5 July Conference for Denuclearization of Mediterranean Basin, WPC-promoted, Algiers, July 5-9.
- 10 July Korea ceasefire negotiations begin 1951. (Armistice signed by UN, N.K. and Comm. China 27 July 1953.)
- 10 July Arrest of Lavrenti Beria for treason announced. 1953. (Secretly tried and shot 18-23 Dec. 1953).
- 13 July President Urrutia, in TV address, charges Communism endangers Cuban revolution. 1959.
- 13 July Pope Pius XII excommunicates all defending Communist anti-Christian doctrines; bars from sacraments those reading CP doctrine. 1949.
- 19 July Laos becomes independent by treaty with France, 1949.

PROPAGANDIST'S GUIDE TO COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

#28

25 April - 8 May 1964

Commentary

Principal Developments

1. Intense political and propaganda activity revolving around the Sino-Soviet struggle continued. The initiative seemed to be largely on the Soviet side, -- not without bitter counter-attacks from the Chinese; but tangible progress was apparently made mainly by the "independence-minded" Communists.

2. The period opened with the Rumanians publishing their plenum statement on April 26, briefly noted as a post-deadline item in our last installment. This lengthy document is a full-fledged "declaration of independence" which might serve as a model for other parties -- independence from domination and exploitation by any other party, independence from any "suprastate or extrastate bodies" or plans, independence for each party and state to determine its own policies and methods. [Detailed resume in Addendum to Chronology]

3. The Chinese, finally reacting to the CPSU polemical campaign launched with the publication of the February plenum materials in the 3 April Pravda, published on the 27th those 3 texts together with a relatively short but savagely derisive People's Daily editorial note (see post-deadline note in our last installment and details in this Chronology). And on May 8, along with other exchanges stemming from the CPSU letter of November 29, they published the text of a CCP letter dated May 7 in reply to the CPSU letter of March 7 which the April 3 Pravda had described. This letter accuses the CPSU of trying to speed up the timetable suggested in the February 29 CCP letter as "to accelerate an open split," and says that "judging by present circumstances, it will be too early to hold 2-party talks in October -- and 'it might require perhaps 4 or 5 years, or even longer, to complete preparations' for a conference! (See Chronology) Brief NCNA and press reports indicate that, in their letter of February 29, the Chinese haughtily brushed aside the offers of the CPSU November 29 letter to expand trade and resume economic aid and technical assistance if the Chinese would cease polemics and negotiate border differences, saying "To be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you." Reportedly, however, they did agree to accept the "unequal treaties" on the borders as "the basis for reasonable settlement."

4. Meanwhile, the CPSU struck at internal Chinese affairs with a major 2-installment editorial in Pravda, April 28-29, emphasizing the illegitimacy of Mao's Stalin-esque rule in China, pointing out that CCP policies on all questions at issue with

the CPSU were promulgated without any discussion or approval by a Party congress, that they are actually in contradiction to the line approved by the last congress in 1956. Apparently Moscow also took the initiative in terminating the exchange of delegations with Peking for the traditional May Day celebration, and the reactions of other parties gave further evidence of the disarray in the movement (see Chrono for details). And Izvestia on the 29th taunted the Chinese on the "more than a million refugees" who have left Communist China for the hell of Hong Kong: "Where are the Chinese leaders leading their country...?"

Among the numerous authoritative articles in the Soviet press during this period perhaps most significant was the lead editorial in the May Kommunist, abridged in Pravda on May 6. Here the CPSU tries, however, inconclusively, to come to grips with the problem of the swell of "independence" sentiment among its former minions: it acknowledges that there is no longer a single directing center for the ICM -- but hastens to emphasize that this by no means signifies permission for any party to "fail to observe collective evaluations and conclusions" or "to respect the opinion of the majority." [Press reports of the first of a promised series of major Pravda articles beginning on the 10th, post-deadline, indicate that the CPSU has tentatively moved still further in the direction of renouncing its "leading role" in favor of a "voluntary union of like-minded people" in which no single party would exercise hegemony.]

5. On the government level, the USSR made several moves to counter the Chinese disruptive efforts among the Afro-Asians. On May 4 it sent a Government statement to all A-A governments vigorously denouncing and rebutting Chinese efforts at the April preparatory meeting for the 2nd A-A conference in Djakarta to "excommunicate the Soviet Union from the family of Asian and African states." (Chrono, April 25 and May 4.) The value of Soviet friendship for the A-A world was the theme behind Moscow's elaborate feting of Algerian President, "Comrade" Ben Bella, during his May Day visit in Moscow, -- and the 16-day visit of Khrushchev to the UAR which got under way as the period ended. And on May Radio Moscow stepped up its broadcasting to Asia sharply -- Mandarin by 50% -- by cutting back broadcasts in 10 Western languages.

6. The Soviets appear to have "contained" "furious" Chinese opposition at executive meetings of two international fronts -- but not without much brawling: see accounts of Algiers IOJ meeting under May 4 and Budapest WPC under May 6. (See

7. The North Vietnam Party revealed that it sent on April 21 a letter to all parties proposing 2-step preparations for a conference: (1) resumption of bilateral CPSU-CCP talks to work out "agreed views" and "prepare the content of the questions

to be discussed" at a preparatory meeting; and (2) the preparatory meeting: no timetable is suggested, but the conference can not be "hastily convened." A New Zealand CP statement cited by Peking also urges adequate preparations. A Rumanian Scinteia editorial on the 30th, however, urges that consultations begin at once, and the French and some other pro-Moscow parties press for immediate action. Moscow added the Bolivian CP to those supporting the CPSU line including the conference and Spain and Portugal supporting the line only. An Italian CP delegation spent 9 days with the CPSU in Moscow discussing a conference but the views of both were apparently unchanged. (Chrono, April 26-May 6) And the Japanese CP delegation which had spent 2 months in the USSR, CPR, North Korea and North Vietnam apparently returned home empty-handed. (Chrono, April 30)

8. Mongolia seemed to be consolidating its tie to the USSR still further, sending home the last of the Chinese aid personnel.

9. A pro-Chinese dissident Communist publication appeared in another West European country: De Rode Vlag (The Red Flag) in the Netherlands (Chrono, April 20).

Significance:

We (pending receipt of full texts) consider of greatest significance during this period the spreading "independence sentiment" among the major parties -- certainly stimulated by the remarkable Rumanian statement of April 26 -- and the apparent CPSU movement toward accommodation with it, as indicated by the May Kommunist editorial and the May 10 Pravda article.

The strategies of the two protagonists seem to have become clearer during this period. It is now obvious that the Chinese are determined to delay indefinitely a world conference, while trying to avoid the onus of obstructionism. The Soviets are not overtly pushing for one (though paragraph 10 above indicates that they are making with preparations), but are concentrating attacks on the chief Chinese vulnerabilities: peace, economic performance, and "cult of personality." They are probably unsure how to handle the new "independence" wave, but have probably reached the conclusion that they cannot simply oppose or suppress it.

The many charges made provide unusually exploitable material to all audiences. The hypocritical Pravda criticism of CCP illegitimacy abounds with charges which can easily be applied against the CPSU itself and against most other parties. Izvestiya's concern for the million Chinese who fled to the hell of Hong Kong will have a hollow ring even to Soviet citizens

many of whom would not require long memories to remember when they would have been glad to flee to a similar hell if the Soviet dictatorship had permitted it. The Chinese renewed accusations of Soviet use of international fronts as tools of foreign policy.

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#23

25 April - 8 May 1964

April 19 (delayed) - Bratislava Pravda article, "The Bitterness of Historical Analogies," hits a new note: "More than 2,000 years ago a very typical Chinese historical tradition was established. In regular historic periods the leaders of peasants' revolts, after their victory, became emperors themselves. The initial notions of the equality and brotherhood of the people remained a dream while an increasingly complex bureaucratic apparatus...became entrenched. This should give the Chinese, with their fondness for historical analogies, food for thought."

April 20 (delayed) - Netherlands press reports the appearance of a pro-Chinese dissident Dutch Communist publication entitled De Rode Vlag (The Red Flag). The mimeographed anonymous 3-page paper claims that the pro-Chinese elements in the Party were not permitted to voice their ideas at the 21st Congress in March, which led the CPN even further down the rightist path of revisionism.

April 24 - NCNA reports that "the first group" of Chinese aid personnel in Mongolia departed: all are being sent home "in accordance with the desire of the Mongolian Government."

April 25 and May 4 - Soviets react strongly to Chinese conduct at the Djakarta preparatory meeting for the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference (April 10 - 15) in a Pravda Observer article on April 25 and in a 2,000-word Government statement sent to "the governments of Asian and African countries" and distributed by Tass on May 4. The latter notes that at Djakarta "the question of participation in the conference of such a big Eurasian power as the Soviet Union, two-thirds of the territory of which is situated on the Asian continent," quite understandably came up. After the Djakarta meeting, Chinese leader Chen Yi "by utterly absurd arguments, tried to whitewash the CPR leaders' line...to 'excommunicate' the Soviet Union from the family of Asian and African states. He actually operated with only one argument: 'The Soviet Union is neither an African nor an Asian country.'" However,

"...Chen Yi is obviously at odds with geography...Every educated person knows that the Soviet Union is not only the biggest European, but also the biggest Asian power. The Soviet Union comprises about 40% of Asia's territory. The Asian part of the USSR is almost twice as big as the territory of all of China..."

Further, "the CPR Government is bringing to the fore with increasing frequency the racial slogan...(which) is harmful and dangerous .....

"The idea is cultivated that people of different skin color cannot understand each other and act hand in hand, even if they have common interests."

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(Chronology Cont.)

rivals. Moreover, suspicion is gradually fostered toward many peoples of the socialist states only because, you see, they are 'white.' But to speculate on slogans of racial solidarity is tantamount to trying to put up some sort of a 'great Chinese wall' between the white, black, and yellow peoples, ....The racial slogan preached by the CPR Government is nothing but a false cover for its hegemonistic aims in regard to the Afro-Asian countries."

The anti-Soviet maneuvers and intrigues are all "for the sake of the narrow nationalistic interests of the leaders of one state aspiring to the role of either leaders or unerring instructors of all the countries of Asia and Africa, and not only them, for that matter. To divide for the purpose of weakening, and to weaken in order to impose one's will, are methods familiar to us from the times of the Roman caesars and Chinese emperors."

"The Soviet Government deems it necessary to draw attention to the irresponsible statements of the official CPR representative in Djakarta.... The Soviet Govt will support the convening of a second Afro-Asian conference if the aim of this conference is the unity of all forces struggling against imperialism, against colonial slavery, and if other aims are not pursued -- a division of these forces ....Those who would like to split the Afro-Asian countries should be given a rebuff...."

The Pravda article is similar but slightly harsher in tone. It also points out that as late as the AAPSO economic conference in Cairo in 1958 the Chinese supported "the irrefutable truth that the Soviet Union is an Asian country." It also introduces a new "ism" into the polemics -- "hegemonism!"

April 26 - See Addendum to Chrono #27 for notice of long Rumanian plenum statement, and the N. Korean Nodong Sinmun editorial of April 19, -- plus the Chou report denouncing Khrushchev's proposal for peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, and the announcement of the "third volume of anti-China materials from the Soviet press. Thus far, this important Rumanian statement -- which is summarized in some detail in the Addendum to this Chronology -- has been distributed in 5 world languages, but Communist media have been very chary of it. The Poles alone have given it extensive coverage. The Chinese have still not mentioned it, and the Soviets have said only (in a 70-word Bucharest item in Pravda on the 23th) that the Rumanian plenum discussed the delegation's talks and "adopted a corresponding decision." Czech Party organ Rude Pravo on 23th published a carefully worded summary giving impression of strong Rumanian support of the CPSU and omitting any passages conveying the "declaration of independence" aspect, and the Hungarians did likewise. Yugoslavs reported more fully, but we have seen no record of reporting by other Communist.

April 26-May 6 - A 9-day visit of an Italian CP delegation to Moscow to discuss the holding of an international conference ended with the Italians still maintaining their reservations in the face of Soviet advocacy, delegation leader Ingrao told the press.

April 26 and continuing: Soviet media continue to publicize items from various parties supporting the CPSU line. Those counted for first time include Portuguese and Spanish (Pravda, April 26), and the Bolivian, the latter endorsing a conference (Pravda, May 6).

April 27 - See Addendum to Chrono #27 for Chinese publication of CPSU plenum materials and April 3 Pravda editorial, plus 1,000-word editorial note by People's Daily which tells its readers that, after the publication of these materials, Khrushchev made 12 anti-China speeches or statements in rapid succession in the 16 days between April 3 and 18.

"They have made a great hue and cry about giving 'the most resolute rebuff' to the CCP, about taking 'collective measures,'...the documents now published...read like the abuses hurled by a harriidan in the street....There are lies and nothing but lies, sophistry and nothing but sophistry, abuse and nothing but abuse...On a rough estimate, there are some 140 or 150 places in the documents where facts are distorted, confounded with wrong, and lies told....Nor is there much new in Khrushchev's speeches: besides his greater vulgarity, his contribution consists of such gestures as pounding the table, stamping his feet, brandishing his fists, and grinding his teeth.

"In these documents and speeches, the classical M-L works are quoted in broken sentences, out of context and not to the point, so that the spirit and essence of M-L is distorted or emasculated....K's revisionism is like a junk shop....

"The CPSU leaders center their attack particularly on Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the Chinese people of all nationalities....In their vain effort to vilify Comrade M. and his ideas, the CPSU leaders are like ants trying to shake a huge tree, ridiculously over-rating themselves.

"Making full use of the label of Trotskyism, the CPSU leaders now allege that the Chinese Communists are 'neo-Trotskyites.' However,...we would like to remind you that there is indeed a person who in the past supported Trotsky's reactionary views and had therefore to make self-criticism for committing the error of Trotskyism; that there is indeed a person

who, singing the same tune as T., launched a frenzied campaign against Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, with the result that the Trotskyites in all countries, then at the end of their rope, began to raise their heads; and that there is indeed a person who is now colluding with Trotskyites everywhere and buying them over for the dirty work of sabotaging revolutions. We are prepared to publish the relevant materials when necessary.

"There is still less that is original in the attacks the CPSU leaders are making on the Chinese people's socialist construction and on our general line, great leap forward and people's communes. Their tune sounds exactly the same as that of the imperialists and reactionaries abroad, and of the landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists in China....We would like to offer them a piece of advice: your erroneous policies have already brought hardship enough on the great Soviet people, and you had better pay more attention to your own domestic affairs instead of 'worrying' yourselves about the Chinese people."

PD closes with a repeated challenge:

"...Do you dare publish our 2 comments on your open letter? We are sure you dare not. In his struggle against Trotsky, Stalin dared to publish Trotsky's statements because truth was on Stalin's side. We are not afraid to publish all your materials, because truth is on our side. You dare not publish our materials which you stigmatize as 'neo-Trotskyism,' because you are afraid of the truth, because you are afraid of the daylight, and because you are afraid that the masses of the people will see through you.

"We hereby declare that when we have finished answering the open letter of the CC/CPSU we shall answer in due order this set of anti-China documents, speeches, and articles, as well as all other such documents, speeches and articles published by the CPSU leaders heretofore or hereafter."

April 23 - People's Daily has a story describing "the hysterical performance of K. when he delivers his anti-China speeches."

Tokyo Asahi Evening News reports that an ultimatum has been secretly issued to several pro-Moscow CC members of the JCP to conform to the line of the pro-Peking Party "mainstream" or face expulsion.

April 23-29 - Pravda publishes a two-part editorial "On Certain Aspects of Party Life in the CPR," intended "to disclose the breaches of Leninist norms of party life in the CCP..." Lenin did not consider party leadership possible without regular convocation of party congresses, Pravda notes, yet the CCP has held only two congresses in the past 35 years (the 6th in 1928, the 7th in 1945, and the 8th in 1956). Moreover, the statutes adopted by the 8th in 1956 specifically call for congresses every 5 years. "However, this apparently has not been noticed by anyone....Is it really because no one in the Party is interested, neither the old Party members nor the 7 million who joined the Party ranks since the last Congress but who have not once participated in the elections of its leading organs and in the working out of the Party line?...It is obvious from all this that the CCP now solves these questions not by the provisions of the statutes but by the orders of Mao Tse-tung, as happened for some time in our country under Stalin...."

Pravda points out that the first Chinese 5-year plan was not discussed by any congress, and the "line of the Three Red Banners," with the adoption of communes, became policy "without congress directives and even contrary to the operative directives of the 1956 Congress." More important, the "new line of the Chinese leaders" on international and internal policy for the ICM -- "a new ideological platform signifying a revision of the most important propositions of M-L" -- is "a sharp change implemented without party counsels, without convocation of a congress, and contrary to the decision of previous CCP congresses." In fact, "strange as it may seem, the CCP does not have its own program."

Pravda notes that the CCP 8th Congress (1956) endorsed the peaceful coexistence line of the 20th CPSU Congress as "an outstanding contribution," and that in signing the documents of the 1957 and 1960 Moscow conferences incorporating this line, the Chinese delegates were following the line of their own Congress. "On what authority, then, do the editorial boards of People's Daily and Red Flag now act in publicizing a directly opposite line?" Pravda goes on to point to the same sort of reversal on the question of a test-ban treaty.

In the second part, Pravda attacks the Chinese departure from Leninist principles in adopting their wildly unrealistic "great leap" 5-year plan in 1958. The 5 years have passed, but "the Chinese leadership has not even considered it necessary to give an account of themselves" on plan fulfillment. "They lack the courage to tell of the shameful failure of the fantastic leap forward. This is reminiscent of the Trotskyite plans of super-industrialization...."

Pravda quotes from a Peng Chen article on the 30th anniversary of the CCP: "The CCP stayed for a long period in the villages and was split up by its enemies. Village petty Bourgeois spontaneity, objectivism, sectarianism, bureaucracy, adventurism,

(Chronology Cont.)

capitulationism, and other tendencies therefore found ... their reflection in the Party." P. adds knowingly: "This helps one to understand much of what is happening today in the CCP."

The CCP is also guilty of "serious peculiarities" in the holding of party congresses. In 1956, they even held rehearsals and secretly elected CC members in advance. "Such a practice had been unknown and had not been used by any other CP." What's more, following their "second session" in 1953, the Chinese never published anything of the report by Teng Hsiao-ping on the 1957 Moscow conference or Mao's speech to the session. "What kind of a period in the development of China was it if a speech made by the head of the Party at the Congress could not be published?"

P. returns to the program: "Is it possible that in the 15th year since the victory of the revolution the Chinese comrades are unable to work out a Party program? ... In this attitude to the Party program ... one can see a certain parallel deriving from the personality cult in the USSR during Stalin's lifetime and the present personality cult in China."

April 29 - Hanoi releases the text of a letter sent on 21 April by the North Vietnam Party CC "to all fraternal Communist and workers parties proposing necessary preparations for a conference of representatives of the C&WP's." The letter says, "we are night and day concerned over the increasingly serious developments which are menacing the solidarity and unity of the socialist camp and ICM," which is "the reason why since 10 January 1962 we have made repeated proposals for convening a conference." It now proposes 2-step preparations: (1) "resumption by the CPSU and the CCP of the talks held in 1963 with a view to working out agreed views and jointly preparing the content of the questions to be discussed at a preparatory conference"; and (2) holding of "a preparatory conference of reps. of a number of fraternal parties to discuss and make adequate preparations for the documents of the conference...."

The Peking press prominently reports the "first session of the Third People's Congress of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, recently held in Urunchi," which "strongly condemned the Soviet authorities for carrying out large-scale subversive activities against Sinkiang," -- and also an editorial by Jacques Grippa, "Secretary of the Belgian CP," in his organ La Voix du Peuple of 10 April concerning the publication of Suslov's report as a "grave new step in the rabid splitting activities in which the CPSU leaders have engaged over the years," etc. NCNA Peking distributes (and press publishes next day) a report of a statement made on a conference in Auckland on 3 April by CPNZ President M. H. Williams. "The cessation of polemics can now only result from mutually acceptable agreement which provides the CCP and others adequate time to complete their replies to the attacks already made."

In Moscow, an Izvestiya article by special correspondent Yury Popov describes the problems of the more than a million Chinese refugees who have crossed the frontier into Hong Kong. "It is difficult to accept the fact that these are refugees from the CPR. One cannot help pondering the causes that make these people abandon everything to rush into the Hong Kong hell.... Where are the Chinese leaders leading the country with their abundant revolutionary phrases, relegating to oblivion the task of bettering the condition of their own people?"

Tass and ADN announce that East German Party Boss Ulbricht will go to Moscow in late May "on an official friendship visit" at Party/State invitation.

April 30 - An editorial, "In the Name of the Supreme Interests of the WCM," in the Rumanian Party daily Scinteia says everyone in Rumania received "with deep interest and complete approval" the plenum report. It closes by warmly appealing for the immediate cessation of the public polemic and "proposes that consultations should begin at once" on preparations for a conference.

Pravda publishes a dispatch from Washington correspondent Vishnevsky on exploitation of the Chinese attacks by the U.S. "masters of anti-Communist propaganda."

The Japanese CP delegation returned after more than 2 months visiting in the USSR, CPR, N. Korea and N. Vietnam. Tokyo Kyodo reported on the 1st that delegation chief Hakamada, "considered the most powerful pro-Peking leader in the JCP," told the press on arrival at Tokyo that the JCP "sits on the fence between the USSR and ComChina, now engaged in bitter ideological warfare." He said his was "a goodwill mission designed to foster mutual understanding between Japan and the USSR on one hand, and Japan and China on the other," and "this is why no joint communiques had been issued." Acknowledging that "difficulties lie ahead for the ICM," he asserted his belief that "the seemingly estranged parties some day will surely patch up differences."

May 1 - The traditional Communist celebrations of May Day gave further evidence of the intensity of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the disarray in the ICM. For the first time, Moscow and Peking did not exchange the customary trade union delegations, and the Chinese on the 30th published an account of correspondence placing the blame on Moscow. The Chinese Federation, it says, on 4 April invited the Soviet Council to send a delegation and on 7 April received a Soviet reciprocal invitation. On the 23rd, however, the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking told the CCP/CC to inform the Chinese Federation that the Soviet side had rejected the Chinese invitation and cancelled its own. On the 25th, the Chinese Federation cabled directly to the Soviet Council repeating the invitation, but received no reply. We have seen no Moscow contradiction of this account.

The Bulgarians, Czechs, Hungarians and East Germans followed Moscow's lead in boycotting Peking, while the Poles, Rumanians,

and Mongolians were represented. Among the West European Communists, apparently only the Italian CP was represented.

Albania reports that "friends" from Belgium, England, France, Ceylon and Japan attended the celebration in Tirana: all but the Japanese were from pro-Chinese dissident factions. Moscow meanwhile was feting Algeria's President, "Comrade" Ben Bella.

The various statements on the occasion either omitted mention of the conflict or mentioned it in comparatively routine manner.

The Japanese Government announces that an 11-man "Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by First Deputy Premier Mikoyan" will visit in Japan May 13-26, the first such visit. A Japanese television commentator is reported as saying that the appointment of Mikoyan to head the delegation "even took the Japanese Foreign Ministry by surprise." He adds:

"The Foreign Ministry speculates that this move is similar to the case of the earlier Soviet dispatch of a CPSU/CC Presidium member to France, and that it represents a Soviet attempt to make a new approach to our country at a time when the Soviet-Chinese confrontation has reached a serious stage."

May 3 - People's Daily features articles from "the 12th issue of Rote Fahne, a fortnightly founded by the Austrian Marxist-Leninists:" one article hits directly at Khrushchev -- "goulash cannot replace socialist revolution." The Peking correspondent of the London Times reports Foreign Minister Chen Yi in reply to "questions submitted by a Western journalist" as asserting that the CPR expects to have cleared up all credits from the USSR, totaling \$1.5-1.6 billion, by the end of next year.

May 4 - A long NONA Algiers report tells of anti-Chinese maneuvers at an Executive Committee meeting of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) which closed there 29 April. Chinese delegate Chou Yu denounced the report of SecyGen Meisner, who "slanderosly accused the Asian-African Journalists Association of 'discriminating' against Soviet and Indian journalists." Chou criticized Soviet "arrogant interference and unscrupulous pressure" against the Djakarta Afro-Asian journalists conference last year, -- where "a forged document aimed at slandering China and attacking some of the participants was put out." At the closing session, a "summary record" "unjustifiably attacking the Chinese delegate's speech" was "adopted without any discussion as a result of the manipulation of the Soviet delegation." The Korean, Indonesian and Albanian delegates joined the Chinese in voting against it. Chou then urged the meeting to discuss and vote on his own resolution, but was "rudely interrupted" by the chairman. Chou emphasized: "Things cannot go on like this any longer."

May 5 - People's Daily gives 2 pages to full text of the April 7 Albanian Zeri i Popullit "Trojan horse" editorial attack on Khrushchev. The North Korean press marks the 146th Marx birthday with routine slap at the revisionists.

May 5-6 - Various reports indicate that the May issue of the Soviet theoretical Kommunist carries several articles strongly supporting the Soviet line in the clash, including the main editorial which says "there is now no directing center" in the ICM, but "the principle of independence does not free any CP from responsibility to the ICM." The absence of a single directing center in the WCM by no means signifies that it is permissible for any party to violate decisions or to fail to observe evaluations and conclusions collectively worked out by the fraternal parties, or not to respect the opinion of the majority." Kommunist says that of the fraternal parties which "exist in nearly 90 countries," "more than 70" have officially denounced "the factionalist platform and practices of the CCP leadership." It also carries a review by V. Maslennikov of a 1963 book, Notes of the Premier of the Far Eastern Republic, by N. Nikoiforov. It starts by quoting Lenin: "Vladivostok is far away, but the city is ours!"

May 6 - Khrushchev and Gromyko sailed from Yalta for their 16-day visit in the UAR. The Chinese press summarizes a harsh statement by the Chinese delegates to the Budapest meeting of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council, "April 25-27, deemed necessary because "the Tass agency, with ulterior motives, released a report turning the facts upside down and attacking the Chinese delegates." (Note: we have not seen the Tass report, but Izvestiya on 6th published a statement by one James Endicott expressing indignation at "The furious attacks on the WPC by the Chinese delegate." People's Daily caps the statement with the flatly stated headline: "International Democratic Organizations Should Not Be Tools of Soviet Foreign Policy." Indicative of the Chinese line at the meeting:

"Directed by the Soviet delegates, somebody at the meeting tried to laud the 'proposals by Khrushchev for renouncing the use of force in settling territorial disputes and border questions, which, as is well known, obviously serves the interests of imperialism. A Soviet delegate even glorified the name of Khrushchev...known to all people of good will as belonging to one who betrays the interests of the peoples and throws himself into the arms of U.S. imperialism."

In Washington, U.S. Information Agency Director Carl Rowan stated to the press that beginning May 1 the USSR cut down on its broadcasting in 10 Western languages and stopped up its programming to China, Mongolia, Korea and India. Soviet broadcasts in Mandarin are up 53%. (On March 31, APR reported that the USSR had begun to jam Radio Peking's Russian-language broadcasts."

May 3 - Peking People's Daily fills 3 pages with "anti-China views and statements of the CPSU leadership." And NCNA releases the text of a CCP letter to the CPSU dated 7 May in reply to the CPSU letter of 7 March, plus the texts of the latter and the CPSU letters of 29 November 1963 and 22 February, and the CCP letters of 20, 27 and 29 February, and an NCNA commentary which says publication is deemed necessary since the CPSU documents published 3 April "divulged information" from the letters and "distorted facts in an attempt to delude the members of the CPSU, the Soviet people, and people everywhere unfamiliar with the true state of affairs." The CCP naturally hopes the CPSU will publish all texts in its own press.

We do not yet have the texts of these letters, but an NCNA release and press reports indicate that in its letter of February 29 the CCP brushed aside the CPSU offer to expand trade and resume economic and technical assistance if the Chinese would cease polemics and agree to negotiate border differences, saying "to be frank, the Chinese people cannot trust you." They also air a number of complaints about the type of aid which they did get before the break, including prices much higher than the world market. Apparently, however, they did accept the "unequal treaties" on boundaries as "the basis for reasonable settlement." The May 7 letter accuses the CPSU of trying to speed up the CCP timetable as "a step in the plot to accelerate an open split," and says that "judging by present circumstances," it will be too early to hold 2-party talks in October -- and "it might require perhaps 4 or 5 years, or even longer, to complete preparations" for a conference!

#### ADDENDUM TO Chronology #23

##### A. Post-deadline items

May 10 and continuing - Moscow correspondents report that Pravda published on the 10th and 11th the first two of a promised series of major articles on problems of the ICM. The first, on the need for "ideological unity" in the face of the Chinese challenge, reportedly supports the concept of world Communism as a "voluntary union of like-minded people" in which no single party would exercise "hegemony." The CPSU says it believes in equality and renounces its "leading role" in the movement. In the second, the Chinese are accused of rigidly following antiquated dogma -- like church workers regard the Old and New Testaments -- and betraying the principles of socialism, of establishing a distorted society in which the people are terrorized and poverty is a permanent way of life.

B. Resume of Rumanian Workers Party statement of 26 April 1964

This 15,000-word document starts with a 2,000-word review of "the action of our Party to end the public polemic" and then discusses "its viewpoint in detail on the main problems...as well as on the ways to safeguard unity." The first part reveals a few new points, e.g. the mission to Peking was reportedly undertaken at the invitation of the CCP. Their account also shows how confidently the Chinese use their polemics as a weapon against the CPSU.

"The fundamental aim of the Rumanian Party delegation was to obtain an agreement on the immediate cessation of the open polemics. The Chinese comrades declared that the open polemics could be stopped only after an agreement was reached through bilateral and multilateral discussions on the conditions of its cessation."

Finally, on 25 March the RWP/CC sent to the CCP and CPSU a draft appeal to all parties, proposing that the three parties meet to discuss and finalize the draft and that both sides refrain from polemics in the interim. The CPSU replied promptly in a 23 March letter, agreeing "in general," but the Chinese never responded. Instead, they published on 31 March their "eighth article replying to the CPSU open letter," the Soviets published their plenum materials on 3 April, and now "the public polemic, joined by numerous fraternal parties, is proceeding with growing intensity."

"Analyzing this state of affairs, the RWP/CC deems it necessary to expound in detail its viewpoint on the main problems...."

The Rumanian "viewpoint" is in close harmony with the CPSU line (it is even more "revisionist," if anything), -- but the statement is extremely circumspect in any criticism of the CCP.

The principal emphasis is on "the norms of relationship among Communist and workers parties and among the socialist states," and here the Rumanians, citing Lenin, impressively state their "declaration of independence" -- clearly from Moscow.

"Cooperation within CEMA is achieved on the basis of the principles of fully equal rights, of observance of national sovereignty and interests, and of mutual advantage and comradely assistance....(The members of CEMA) have established that the main means of achieving international socialist division of labor, the main form of cooperation between their national economies, is to coordinate plans on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

"Our Party has very clearly expressed its point of view, declaring that since the essence of the suggested measures (such as a joint plan and a single planning body for all member countries, interstate

jointly owned by several countries, interstate economic complexes, etc.) lies in shifting some functions of economic management from the competence of the respective state to the competence of superstate bodies or organisms, these measures are not in keeping with the principles which underlie relations among the socialist countries.

"The idea of a single planning body for all CEMA countries has the most serious economic and political implications. The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential, and inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of a socialist state, -- the state plan being the chief means through which the socialist state achieves its political and socio-economic objectives.... Transmitting such levers (of managing economic and social life) to the competence of superstate or extrastate bodies would make sovereignty an idea without any content.

"(Presentation of such forms of superstate management as derived from Lenin) ignores the fact that Lenin referred to a problem of a time when socialism will be victorious through the world.... There is no basis now for establishing these forms, linked to setting up a single world economy, which is a problem of a future state in history."

The statement goes on to declare that "socialist international division of labor cannot mean isolation of the socialist countries from the general framework of world economic relations and asserts that Rumania, "like other socialist states, develop its economic links with all state irrespective of their social system."

Carrying their declaration beyond economic relations to "the most adequate forms and methods of building socialism" (and striking at the CCP as well as the CPSU), the Rumanians assert:

"Bearing in mind the diversity of the conditions of socialist construction, there are not and there can be no unique patterns and recipes: no one can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries or parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist party, it is a sovereign right of each socialist state, to elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist construction. Strict observance of the basic principles of the new-type relations among the socialist countries is the primary requisite of the unity and cohesion of these countries...."

It is in their final 3,000-word section, "For safeguarding the unity and cohesion of the WCM," that the Rumanians lash out at "both your houses":

"As far back as the last stage in the Comintern's existence, it became obvious that the solution of the problems of the workers movement in one country or another by an international center no longer suited the stage of development of the world Communist and working class movement. Incorrect methods, interference in the domestic affairs of CP's, went as far as the removal and replacement of leading cadres and even of entire Central Committees, as far as imposing leaders from without, the suppression of distinguished leading cadres of various parties, as far as censuring and even dissolving CP's ....

"The balance of class forces and their disposition in one country or another, the shifts in forces and the evolution of the masses' frame of mind, the peculiarities of the internal and international political conditions of a country cannot be better and more thoroughly known by anyone than by the CP of that country. It is the exclusive right of each party to work out independently its political line, its concrete objectives and the ways and means of attaining them, by creatively applying the general truths of M-L and the conclusions it arrives at from an attentive analysis of the experience of other Communist and workers parties.

"There is not and cannot be a "parent" party and a "son party," parties that are "superior" and parties that are "subordinate"....No party has or can have a privileged place, or can impose its line or opinions on other parties....No party may label as anti-Marxist or anti-Leninist a fraternal party whose opinions it does not share....No party is allowed to bypass the party leadership in one country or another, and even less to launch appeals for removal or change in party leadership....

"It is inconceivable that in relations between CP's reciprocal and deeply offensive accusations are leveled against the leaders of a fraternal party as being 'the biggest revisionists of our times,' who are in 'collusion with U.S. imperialism,' and 'throw wide open the gates for the restoration of capitalism'; or that they are 'Trotskyites' who 'furiously attack world socialism,' 'partners on the right flank of the American wild men.'...The public polemic and its forms of manifestation have created confusion in a number of CP's and among the ranks of working people in a series of countries....

"Particularly serious is the fact that in such a situation the central press organs of one of the largest fraternal parties, the CCP, assert that in the conditions now prevailing in the Communist movement, a split both on the international plane and within various parties becomes necessary and unavoidable, and that the dialectics of the development of the ICM is 'unity, struggle, and even a split, and after that again unity on a new basis.' In our opinion, this means to give a theoretical foundation for a split: it means a call for a split....

"Owing to their prestige, the CPSU and the CCP have a particular responsibility and role in reestablishing the unity of the Communist movement ....

"The RWP deems it necessary that immediate consultations should be started involving the CPSU, the CCP, and the other fraternal parties, with a view to setting up a commission of representatives of a number of parties. This commission should proceed to prepare a conference of representatives of the Communist and workers parties. Such a conference should be convened only after having been thoroughly prepared. The RWP/CC considers that a conference with the participation of only part of the CP's would run counter to the cause of unity, and would lead to an aggravation of the situation, to the isolation of some of the fraternal parties, to the establishment of a split in the world Communist and working class movement."

13 May 1964

733 Forced Unity in Communist China  
25X1C10b

OPPORTUNITY: To expose Communist China's deliberately fostered

**BACKGROUND:** (See unclassified attachment of same title)  
Mao Tse-tung's Communist China is a prime example of a totalitarian regime's attempt to create the facade of a completely unified society. Official Chicom statements themselves are often the best refutation of this claim. Chicom propaganda often complains that youths do not have the desired attitude toward their work and that intellectuals are not fulfilling their obligations to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Peasants were accused of not supporting the Great Leap Forward and just recently the CCP has announced new plans to impose military discipline on industrial workers. The regime appears to have adequate control to keep itself firmly in power, but at times it must resort to severe measures of repression in order to carry out its extremist policies. This repression leaves pockets of resentment among different groups and the Chicom propaganda machine is used to make them feel isolated and prevent organized resistance from taking shape.

Differences of opinion have occurred among the leaders themselves over such policy questions as the role of men and weapons in modern warfare and the practicality of the Great Leap Forward. These differences probably account for the fall from grace of Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai and the top economist, Chen Yun.

The Chicoms must conceal the disaffections among their own people and the differences between their leaders from the outside world in order to avoid a disastrous show of weakness. This is the primary reason for such emphasis on internal unity in Chinese Communist propaganda. (See 13 May NYTimes front page article "Internal Opponents of Mao Warned by Chinese Reds." Also in Press Comment same date)

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**ACTION:** We do not suggest that the leaders of the Chinese

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784 AF. European Communists in Africa

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**BACKGROUND:** The absence of large, exploitable worker and peasant classes has made it more difficult for the Soviet Union to penetrate the African continent in an attempt to establish Communist regimes than it was in Europe and Asia. To meet this problem, the USSR's direct action program in Africa and the efforts of its powerful front groups, particularly those of the Afro-Asian complex, are being substantially extended by increasing activities of East European Communist governments and parties in the newly independent nations of Africa. However, a lesser effort over a longer period of time may be earning a larger rate of return, namely the advisors and training programs of the pro-Soviet Communist parties of free Europe.

The acceptability and mobility of a British or French Communist in Africa is greater than that of a Russian or East European, especially in countries still influenced by the metropolitan power. He is even accepted where the local Communist is banned, particularly in North Africa. Lingual and cultural affinities are enhanced by the grudging awe in which the former colonial powers are still held. The influence of the West European Communist, in spite of -- if not because of -- his country's colonial past, is frequently greater than his number.

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735 EE,WE. Soviet Interference in Finnish Internal Affairs

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**BACKGROUND:** According to the CPSU central organ Pravda, Moscow's policy is one of absolute respect for and non-interference with the sovereignty and internal affairs of other nations. The dearest wish of Moscow is allegedly for "mutual confidence and friendly cooperation." The Parisian weekly news service, Les Informations Politiques et Sociales (22 Apr 64), doubts that Soviet intentions are as benevolent as Pravda claims, in an article "Soviet 'Non-Interference,'" to wit:

The press agencies of 15 April and newspapers of 16 April carried declarations by a 'personality in the French Delegation to the O.T.A.S.E. (SEATO) Council' which defines 'the French position concerning South Vietnam.' These declarations conclude with the following statement: 'It is possible that the Chinese Communists find advantage in not interfering in the affairs of South Vietnam as the U.S.S.R. has abstained from interfering in Finland.'

Whatever the facts may be concerning China and Vietnam, it is inaccurate to cite Finland as an example of Soviet non-interference.

In Europe there is one national example of true neutrality, free of Soviet interference; it is the case of Austria.

But in Finland, Soviet interference is continuous and particularly heavy. It is unfortunate that a French spokesman, apparently qualified to know better, vouches before world opinion for the hypocritical and deceitful Soviet claim to non-interference in Finland.

The most spectacular and noteworthy aspect of Soviet interference in Finland is Moscow's permanent veto of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, because of its anti-Communism.

Moscow forbids Finland to have a Socialist Prime Minister. A similar ban exists as regards the Presidency of the Republic, although that position may be less powerful than the Prime Minister in Finland.\*

The U.S.S.R. does not impose a Communist regime in Finland; the country is not controlled

annexed to the U.S.S.R. as are the 'popular democracies.' But the Soviets insist on maintaining in power pro-Soviet personalities, like Pres. Kekkonen, who, while they may be politically less to the left than the Socialists, are much more docile toward Moscow. Pres. Kekkonen is the only Chief of State of a non-Communist country who attended in person the ceremonies celebrating Khrushchev's 70th birthday.

Let people then know what they are talking about, and let them not confuse Finland with Austria."

[Ed.\*The opinion of the relative strength of the two offices is of questionable validity]

While the French press cites Austria as being free of Soviet interference, Switzerland is an example even more apt. In any case, the French are not alone in seeing Moscow's policy toward Finland as something less than "neighborly cooperation and mutual trust." Farmand of Oslo editorialized on 11 April 64:

...Perhaps there are also elements of fear (of the Soviets) present in Norway. The Soviets openly play on the strings of fear. As late as this week Finland's former Prime Minister, V. Sukselainen received a sharp reprimand from the Kremlin - via the Soviet Party's main organ, Pravda - for recently having participated in meetings in the USA and Sweden on behalf of Estonian refugees. The Stockholm daily, Dagbladet, is of the opinion that Sukselainen's Party comrades - Agrarians - can use the Moscow criticism of Sukselainen to get rid of him as Chairman at the next national assembly. And probably Dagbladet knows what it is talking about this time.

These two press commentaries accurately reflect the general awareness of the Soviets' heavy-handed meddling in Finnish politics. The finer details are less generally known, though equally unpleasant. [REDACTED] 127-2-22 May 64 (Item 750) and 122 of

6 Apr 64 (Item 765) point out that the Finnish "Kekkonen Plan" is simply a front for the latest of Moscow's recurring attempts to trick the rest of the world into disarming itself unilaterally. It seems less strange that a President of Finland would lend himself to such deception when one remembers that Soviet threats and intimidation have largely influenced who the Finnish President may be and what he may do or not do.

For example, in the above-mentioned campaign to scuttle Agrarian Party Chairman Sukselainen, Kekkonen is clearly serving Soviet desires. In this move he is allied with a former Agrarian Party Chairman, Arvo Korsimo, whose unsavory past is full of such incidents. [REDACTED] of

Party funds and cold-blooded collaboration with the Soviets. Korsimo and pro-Soviet associates control the so-called Agrarian newspaper, Maakansa, and use it to attack the Social Democrats and other Soviet targets. The similar line and phraseology of Maakansa's and Pravda's diatribes reflects collusion between the two.

On 7 Feb 64, Maakansa published a strong attack against the Social Democrats. Two days later a very similar article appeared in Pravda's first major attack on the Social Democrats since the latter's Party Congress of June 1963, when TANNER, the Soviets' "worst enemy," was removed from the Party Chairmanship and LESKINEN, another Soviet "enemy," was removed from the Party Executive Committee. Pravda's Stepan SMIRNOV wrote on 2 February:

...Both inside and outside Finland it has been stated many times that the most important reason for this crisis (among the Social Democrats) was the political line which Tanner and Leskinen urged on the party. The Finnish press has emphasized that this line was first and foremost a friendly one toward the Atlantic Pact and a hostile one toward the Soviet Union. Its main purpose was to use Finland for realizing primarily anti-Soviet military-strategic plans in Northern Europe....As is known, the majority of the Finnish people resolutely rejected the policy of anti-Soviet adventures which has caused such misfortune in Finland. Time is the best teacher and it convincingly proved to the Finns that a completely different policy corresponds to their national interests - a policy of mutual confidence and friendship with the Eastern neighbor. And only the few persons who have sunk into ultranationalism and hatred for Communism have not desired to learn by history. Among these were Tanner and Leskinen.

This thinly veiled threat could be concisely paraphrased - "You Finns have had one lesson in what it means to oppose us. Don't make the mistake of trying it again."

As quoted above from the Oslo press, Pravda's Smirnov launched an astonishing attack on 6 April at a new target in Finnish politics, Agrarian Party Chairman Sukselainen. Smirnov wrote:

The reciprocal visits of the Heads of State of Finland and the Soviet Union, as well as those of representatives of different social circles, are a natural expression of the friendly neighbor relations between our countries....The relations, based on the friendship between our peoples, mutual confidence and cooperation, are at present warmly supported both in the Soviet

Union and Finland. Recent developments prove that the opponents of Finno-Soviet relations, i.e., the extreme rightist circles and the Tannerites, are on the losing side in Finland. However, it must be mentioned that such reactionaries as Leskinen have not desisted from trying to damage the good neighbor relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Different social circles in the Soviet Union have been wondering at the fact that lately some representatives of Finnish political life, for example former Prime Minister Sukselainen, have taken part as guests of honor in celebrations arranged in the U.S. and Sweden by Estonian emigrants who are tainted by cooperation with Hitlerites and who are known for their animosity toward our country. This is scarcely consonant with the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union to which the same Mr. Sukselainen has so often sworn fidelity.

This instance of blatant Soviet interference in Finnish internal affairs backfired unexpectedly. The following day Sukselainen received a solid vote of confidence from an Agrarian Party district organization, which condemned "efforts to direct the Agrarian Party from the side by undemocratic means." Independent HELSINGIN SANOMAT made the unusually outspoken comment that, "There is no reason outside the Agrarian Party to feel malicious pleasure at the (Pravda) article which once again represents extreme interference in the leadership problems of one of our political parties."

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786 AF, FE, NE. Sino-Soviet Maneuvering in Afro-Asian and  
25X1C10b International Front Meetings

**BACKGROUND:** Recriminations between Chicom and Soviet delegates in international front and Afro-Asian conferences continue unabated; indeed, they are becoming more bitter. The Chicoms vigorously pursue a policy of strengthening ties among Asian-African (and Latin American) governments and also non-governmental functional organizations in the same geographic areas. On the non-governmental level, their goal is to establish competitive instruments, -- i.e. their own controlled regional front organizations outside the framework of the traditional Soviet-led international front organizations. The Chicoms accuse the Soviets of opposing the efforts of the peoples in these areas to strengthen their unity and of opposing consultations on measures for anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggles. The Soviets, so the Chicoms charge, slander and vilify such activities as "regional," "racist," and "isolationist" actions rather than accepting them for what they are: anti-imperialist struggle.

Soviet reaction to the, at least, one year-old open Chicom splitting activities in the world-wide fronts and in the Afro-Asian governmental and non-governmental organizations is beginning to sharpen perceptively. The Chicom/Indonesian maneuvering at this year's 10 - 15 April preparatory meeting for a second Afro-Asian (Bandung) conference aiming at the exclusion of the Soviets seems to have stirred the gravest Soviet concern. Until this event, the Soviets and more so the Chicoms did publicize their respective points of view of the clashes at international conferences. Now, with the prospect of being denied participation in an Afro-Asian government-level conference, the Soviets have taken their dilemma to the governments of the Afro-Asian countries in a statement, repeated as a TASS bulletin over Radio Moscow on 4 May 1964. The essence of the Soviet statement is:

The Soviet government is grateful that the question of its participation in the Afro-Asian conference was taken up since two-thirds of its territory is situated on the Asian continent. CPR Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement at the preparatory meeting that "the Soviet Union is neither an African nor an Asian country" therefore is an "utterly absurd argument."

Chen Yi is at odds with geography; and he seeks to adapt geography to the "special splitting purposes of the Chinese leaders." The Soviet Union is not only the biggest

pillar near Sverdlovsk marking the boundary between Europe and Asia. has existed for a long time and was not brought there on the eve of the Djakarta conference "to hinder the CPR representative from making a discovery". Or, if the Soviet Union is not an Asian country and China is, how can a common boundary of 7,000 kilometers exist between them?

The CPR government relies increasingly on racialism, which is to determine the community of political interests and joint actions in the international areaa. The CPR fosters the idea that people of different color cannot understand each other, and fosters suspicion toward many people of the "socialist states" only because they are white. But to speculate on slogans of racial solidarity is tantamount to trying to put up some sort of a 'great Chinese wall' between the white, black and yellow peoples. Taking resort to racist theories is not novel: "there is no need to recall the names of those who tried to base their policy on this man-hating foundation and how they ended up".

At critical moments, the Soviet Union has protected Asian and African countries with all its might, disregarding the fact that most of the Soviet population is white. Hence, the racial slogan is nothing but a cover for the CPR's hegemonistic aims but spreading racial prejudices particularly into the sphere of inter-governmental relations may only lead to a weakening of the existing anti-imperialist, anti-colonial front.

The 2,000- word Soviet statement asserts that the Soviet Union's might and authority lend strength to the achievement of the goals of the Afro-Asian conference. The CPR's intrigues are divisive, revealing narrow nationalistic interests of the leaders of one state who aspire to the role of leaders or "unerring instructors" of all Afro-Asian countries. The statement concludes that the Soviet Union will support the Afro-Asian conference if its aims are to be the unity of all forces rather than the division of these forces.

This statement is the first instance in which the Soviet Union has officially sought non-Communist support against the Chicoms at governmental level. Indeed, the preparatory Afro-Asian meeting set off intense lobbying by both contestants for support from non-Communist countries. The Soviet statement confronts the Afro-Asians with deciding on supporting an Afro-Asian (Bandung) conference or a Nonaligned (Belgrade) conference -- the Soviets obviously favoring the latter whether eventually invited to the Afro-Asian conference or not.

In the meantime, the Soviets are increasing contacts with African countries and are receiving more African visitors in Moscow. In the closing speech in Sofia at the March executive committee meeting of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of

Trade Unions (WFTU), its secretary general Louis Saillant significantly advocated the establishment of united organizations of the working people of African and Latin American countries and asked for initiative toward the convening of an Afro-European trade union conference.

On the other hand, the long projected Chicom-Indonesian-conceived Afro-Asian Labor Conference (AALC) for Djakarta is only now taking on concrete form with a preparatory meeting in sight for June in Djakarta. The Soviets are reportedly making participation of the Soviet labor unions (AUCCTU) contingent on holding the meeting in Africa and allowing the WFTU to participate as co-sponsor. Apparently in an attempt to overcome some of the objections of the Soviets and those won to its side through intense lobbying, those responsible for the preparations seem now agreeable: to admit virtually every union which cares to send a representative; to grant equal speaking time to two or more opposing unions from the same country; and to admit WFTU and ICFTU representatives in observer status with rights to speak.

Each front organization and Afro-Asian meeting furnishes new evidence that the Sino-Soviet conflict rears its ugly head making it extremely doubtful that the AALC, much-postponed because of careful Sino-Soviet jockeying for position will come off without the conflict burgeoning further. At the executive committee meeting of the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) in Algiers in late April the Chicoms found themselves forced to condemn the splitting activities of the Soviet-controlled IOJ secretariat. The meeting adopted a "summary record" which, the Chicoms charged, distorted the proceedings and was adopted without discussion as a result of Soviet manipulation. Unable to be heard, the Chicom delegation distributed copies of its draft resolution among the delegations. The IOJ secretary general on the other hand, accused the Chicom-dominated Afro-Asian Journalists Association (AAJA) of discriminating against Soviet and Indian journalists, which can only lead to a situation where the AAJA does not represent the Asian continent. The Chicoms retorted to this charge that the IOJ and the Soviets look upon all regional activity, which is not subject to their control, as illegal and unreasonable. The Mali delegate insisted that questions of AAJA membership and other AAJA matters should be settled by members of the Association and that the IOJ should not inject itself. The Chicom delegation enlarged on the fact that the AAJA is an independent organization, i.e., is not affiliated with the IOJ.

Following the Presidential Committee meeting of the World Peace Council (WPC) in Budapest (25 to 27 April), the Chicoms charged that this international democratic organization is becoming a tool for carrying out the "erroneous" foreign policies of the Soviet Union (support of the partial test ban treaty, etc.) to which the CPR will never agree. The Chicoms spoke of the invitation to a representative of the South Vietnam Liberation Front but his admittance to the session on the question of

South Vietnam only as a "disgraceful incident", which revealed the Soviet manipulation of the WPC and demonstrated its mere pretense of supporting the national independence struggle. The Chicoms demanded that WPC rid itself of Soviet control and put into practice the principle of democratic consultation required of an international organization.

The above highlights of recent events reveal the intensity of the struggle between Soviets and Chicoms for the leadership of the fronts and of regional governmental and non-governmental organizations and groupings particularly in the Afro-Asian area. Undoubtedly greatly concerned about the Chicoms' successes in the contest for leadership, it appears that the Soviets are now embarking upon an effort to discourage the Africans from participating in those Afro-Asian ventures in which Soviet influence cannot be but minimal in the months ahead; or, alternatively, to seek ways and means to be represented in an influential role in regional Afro-Asian meetings.

25X1C10b

Continuation of previous guidances



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787 WH. Cuba and Capital Punishment

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**BACKGROUND:** [For more background information, see unclassified attachment, Cuba and Capital Punishment, and its Spanish version, Cuba y la pena capital.] 25X1C10b

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According to a booklet recently published by the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, a reliable exile student group, 3,351 Cubans have been killed by the Cuban government since Fidel Castro assumed power on New Year's day 1959. This is about the lowest of the responsible estimates of loss of life attributable to the Castro regime: other estimates run higher. According to the same source, 1,161 of these are identified as having been executed after public trials. In other words, the executions were legal, or made to appear legal.

For such a large number of persons to have perished before a firing squad in one small country and over a relatively short period of time contrasts in a shocking manner with both the de jure and the de facto status of capital punishment elsewhere in the hemisphere. Despite its heritage of violence and primitivism in public and private life, Latin America is distinguished among the great regions of the world by its almost unanimous repudiation of capital punishment. According to a recent survey by the United Nations, of fourteen Latin American countries replying to the questionnaire, nine have abolished capital punishment by an explicit constitutional provision or by an article of positive law, and in three others the death penalty has been abolished de facto, since no death sentence has been carried out during the last five years or more.

Traditionally Latin American nations have had recourse to violence to solve the problem of succession -- the coup d'etat or the palace revolution. But in recent years, in spite of dozens of unconstitutional changes of regime, the vast majority have been bloodless coups, and none has been characterized by subsequent bloody reprisals.

In the case of the atrocities in Cuba, most observers at first thought that the Castroites were seeking limited revenge and that things would settle down to normal after a little initial bloodletting. It is now evident, however, that Castro is following the pattern of Soviet Russia and Communist China by adopting systematic terror as a permanent technique of government. Without this indispensable instrument of the modern police state, the Castro regime would soon be overthrown by the Cuban people themselves.

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THE REPORTER

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# Kafka's Nightmare Comes True

GEORGE BAILEY

PRAGUE

THEY CAME to get me at five o'clock in the morning: two Czech soldiers, privates in baggy uniforms with the regulation wide black belts and heavy bronze buckles, each carrying a rifle. They waited outside my room in the Hotel Continental in Pilsen while I dressed; then they escorted me through the quiet streets to the *kommandatura*. I was ushered into an office where a staff captain and a lieutenant stood waiting. My papers were not in order, they said; I would have to leave the country on the next train. But the next train for Germany would not leave for another five hours. Meanwhile, said the staff captain, we could talk. Both he and the lieutenant were obviously worried. What did I think was going to happen to Czechoslovakia? The president kept saying that the country would have to be "a bridge between East and West." But could little Czechoslovakia be a bridge between two enormous power blocs? They were very kind: they had coffee brought in—again and again—and *rohlíki* (Czech croissants), and jam and butter. Technically, I was their prisoner; actually, I was a welcome guest. The scene might have been taken from one of Kafka's novels. That was eighteen years ago.

A FEW WEEKS AGO I returned to Czechoslovakia from Berlin via Dresden. A good part of my luggage consisted of the latest bulky report of the central committee of the East German Communist Party (SED). It reflected the unprecedented uproar of the East German intelligentsia for the past three months over the new outspokenness radiating throughout the Soviet bloc from Czechoslovakia. In the wake of a long delayed de-Stalinization, both Prague and Bratislava were flourishing as centers

of the arts and open-end inquiry. And the focal point of the movement was the German-Jewish writer whose novels *The Trial* and *The Castle* I had been reading eighteen years before. Franz Kafka, who was born and had lived in Prague and died in Vienna in 1924, is not even loosely speaking a "Czech" writer. He was a Hebrew scholar of considerable accomplishment and he spoke and wrote Czech, but the body of his work is in German, his first language. The point for the Communists, pro and con, however, is not so much a literary debate as a political one, for Kafka is an arch-prophet of the alienation of modern man in an increasingly industrialized mass society and a devastating critic of totalitarianism.

The Czechs, I soon discovered, have not only adopted and rehabilitated Kafka; they have created a cult around him. The various houses in which the Kafka family lived in Prague and the family grave in the new Jewish cemetery have become something like national monuments. His complete works in Czech translation are being reissued. More important, the first translation into Russian of Kafka for issue in the Soviet Union, a selection of his short stories, was made this January, leaving East Germany the only European country in which Kafka continues to be banned. The Ulbricht régime permits certain books about Kafka but none by Kafka.

## Bomb the Ban

The Kafka controversy was started at the World Peace Congress in Moscow in July, 1962, by Jean-Paul Sartre. In a speech that must have come as a surprise to his Russian hosts, Sartre called for the "dis-

armament of culture" as the prerequisite of ideological coexistence. He went on to cite the attitude of a society to the works of Kafka as the touchstone of cultural disarmament. Sartre's statement flew straight in the face of a ban on Kafka and Communist insistence that there can never be *ideological* coexistence between Communists and capitalists. It is surprising that his initiative did not evoke a violent and categorical rebuttal. But it did not, and the fat was in the fire.

In November, 1962, the Czech Union of Writers invited Sartre to Prague for lectures and a colloquium on Kafka. In May, 1963, a Kafka congress, arranged by Professor Edvard Goldstücker, the country's leading "Kafkologist," was held in Liblicá, a castle near Prague. The roster of congress lecturers is especially noteworthy. In addition to speakers from Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Yugoslavia, two westerners were invited: Ernst Fischer, writer and critic and member of the central committee of the Austrian Communist Party, and Roger Garaudy, a philosophy professor and member of the politburo of the French Communist Party. The congress lasted two days, and at the end the participants were divided for and against Kafka, with the East Germans alone comprising the latter group. But it was the Communist westerners who provided the sensation of the congress. Both Fischer and Garaudy traced the cause of alienation to modern industrial society itself—without regard to the political system of a country.

The Kafka congress as a whole, and the performances of Fischer and Garaudy in particular, drew a furious blast from Alfred Kurella, member

of the central committee of the SED and boss of East German culture. Kurella attacked Garaudy bitterly, complaining that in his treatment of the subject, "Alienation has virtually become synonymous with the cult of personality." Indeed, Kurella would seem to have a point: the Czech intellectuals and their western Marxist colleagues are using Stalinism as a blanket label for everything in life under Communism from which they feel "alienated"—that is, don't like. A leading Czech critic explained to me that Kafka had proved to be the supreme realist for Communists because the Stalin period was the severest form of mass alienation in modern history, adding—as an afterthought—"along with Nazism and fascism." "Alienation will continue," he said, "until the socialist system is finally perfected. Why, that may take decades—even hundreds of years!"

**T**HE UPSHOT of the Kafka congress has been to lay bare Khrushchev's ideal of "dynamic conformism"—a formulation that pretty much sums up the essential Communist dilemma—as a simple contradiction in terms. After sixteen years of isolation, on the surge of a de-Stalinization movement that is all the more a sustaining force because of peculiar internal circumstances as well as because of its belatedness, the Czechs and Slovaks are using Kafka as a pontoon bridge between East and West—an emergency means to restore the community of culture. Edward Albee's play *Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* is currently playing to packed houses in Prague. In the Czech translation the title has been changed to *Who's Afraid of Franz Kafka?*

The theatre has become the main avenue of creative release from the suffocating drabness of totalitarian regimentation. There are now some twenty-five legitimate theatres in Prague and about fifty amateur theatrical groups operating in Prague and its environs. People go to the theatre in droves—every performance is sold out days in advance—for the express purpose of reacting. The result is a kind of aggressive ap-

plause. The people sit on the edges of their seats, poised to catch the points as they are made and to underline them with immediate and vehement clapping. This sets up a tension between actors and audience that is new in my experience.

### The False Noses

In the theatre the Czechs lampoon everything—the government, the party, themselves. I saw the hit of the season, *Zahradni Slavnost* ("Garden Party"), in which the party-state is personified as a seedy manager-cum-father figure, at once silly, cynical, and officious, who insists on amusing his charges by suddenly affixing a false nose. He uses a bigger nose for each succeeding act as the need for offsetting the tragedy of the situation grows. His inevitable comment at the end of every discussion or episode is "*No Nic*" ("never mind—no matter"). The hero is a favorite son who brings off the admirable coup of liquidating the state board of liquidation. The wit that pervades "Garden Party" and much of life in Czechoslovakia today has a wormwood quality.

The overpowering impression in traveling through Czechoslovakia is one of unrelieved squalor. The accumulation of dirt and decay in Prague, and especially in Pilsen, is so flagrant that it seems deliberate. The scribbled signs tacked on many buildings almost sum up the situation: "*Pozor, Pada Omítka*" ("Beware of Falling Plaster"). Most of the Czechs I talked to were quick to apologize for this really depressing state of general disrepair. "Why don't people clean things up a bit?" I asked. "Nobody cares: nothing belongs to anybody any more; everything to the state." "Then why doesn't the state clean things up?" "The state can't. It has neither the money nor the men to do the job."

A current theory has it that the Czech economy has been subtly and systematically ruined by the Good Soldier Schweik that is in every Czech—Jaroslav Hasek's folk hero, the certified idiot who is nobody's fool and whose "ingenious stupid-

ity" foils authority at every turn. This is a myth. But there is a legitimate cause for the myth. The Czech economy has indeed been subtly and systematically sabotaged, but the real culprit is the system. The pervading neglect is categorically determined by a system of priorities designed to foster the indiscriminate expansion of basic industries. Over the past ten years the Czech government has consistently invested from thirty to thirty-five per cent of the national budget in the economy, mainly in the expansion of industry. Billions of dollars have been spent in building new plants and machines that are either not yet in production or have only been put into production long after construction was completed. Maintenance costs increase geometrically with plant expansion. The disregard of maintenance has disrupted services and crippled transport. It has resulted in poor quality of product and a high incidence of rejects. The Czechs lost 1.5 billion crowns (over \$200 million) through rejects last year alone—an almost twelve per cent increase over 1962—and the relatively poor quality of many Czech products has caused dissatisfaction among consumers both at home and abroad. This, combined with a rigid central planning system that studiously ignores consumer interests and needs, has produced a vast backlog of unsalable products. The Czechs did not vociferously complain, but they did refuse to buy. "A crucial oversight of the totalitarian state," said a Slovak writer, "is that there is no codified penalty for sales resistance." Meanwhile the ponderous, dilapidated machinery of state enterprise creaks implacably on, churning out huge quantities of outmoded or inferior articles which can never be sold or which, if any are sold, merely ensure that future Czech goods will not be.

The plan for the building and operation of power stations is far behind schedule. A shortage of electricity is the chronic anemia of all Communist states. The scanty lighting of streets gives their cities a peculiar, spectral aspect at night. In villages the blackout is almost com-

plete. Driving from Brno to Bratislava at night, I noticed that the headlights of my car usually provided the only illumination in the streets of the villages through which I passed. "What did people use for light before candles?" runs the appropriate Czech joke. Answer: "Electricity." Here there is a direct connection between the general Communist economic failure and the policy of peaceful coexistence: the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts consumes enormous amounts of electricity. Faced with bankruptcy, each régime has been forced to choose between feeding power into productive industry or pouring it down the rat-hole of electronic interference. The choice throughout the bloc has been to reduce jamming. The Czech government has ceased jamming Voice of America broadcasts in English and all Austrian broadcasts. The latter clearance is particularly appreciated since many of the people speak German as a second language.

**T**HE CRACKS in the Czechoslovak economy began to appear as early as 1955, but the government took alarm only in 1962, when it was already too late to effect a relatively smooth correction. The year 1963 was set aside for reorganization and the drafting of a new long-term plan. Hence the production plan for last year called for an increase of only one per cent. Actually, total production fell 0.4 per cent below the 1962 level. To make matters worse, the new plan proved to be useless. The reverse was even more violent in some sectors of the economy. Building construction, for example, fell ten per cent below the 1962 level. But the worst performance of all was in the construction of agricultural housing, where only five per cent of the plan was fulfilled. This spectacular failure was the more distressing because agriculture is the particular problem child of the economy and the agricultural construction program was designed to attract more workers to the farms. Gross agricultural production for 1962 fell 7.6 per cent below the 1961 level, and the government has so far been unable to equal.

The government became worried. In the fall of 1962, the first queues appeared in front of foodstores: food, and especially meat, had become scarce. Shortly thereafter a weekly meatless day and an anti-meat propaganda campaign were introduced. "I'm going to Pilsen," says one Czech to another in Prague. "Why? Is there meat in Pilsen?" "No—that's where the end of the line is." Then came the great Soviet wheat-crop failure, which affected the entire bloc. "Have you heard," runs the current Czech anecdote, "about the latest Russian miracle? They plant wheat in the Ukraine, and it comes up in Canada!" At the same time the Chinese reduced their exports of food—including a good deal of canned meat—to the merest trickle. By 1963, trade with China, once fifth among Czech foreign clients, had virtually ceased. Worst of all, COMECON, the Soviet-bloc economic union, failed to meet its commitments to the Czechs.

Under the allocation of economic activities laid down in the Soviet grand design for the satellite countries, Czechoslovakia was to provide machines, tools, and finished products, while predominantly agricultural countries were to provide much of the food. In most cases the countries designated simply could not provide the food. Where they could, other considerations prevented the promised deliveries. For example, COMECON has had its own chicken war: the Hungarians, who specialize in the production of chickens for export, preferred to send them to western countries for hard currency. The Romanians found a similar excuse for nondelivery. To make up for the resultant shortages, the Czech government has been forced to delve still further into its depleted foreign currency reserves to purchase wheat from Canada and, through European middlemen, wheat and soybeans from the United States. The Czech economy is eating its own tail.

#### **'How Could We Have Done It?'**

The greatest single problem in agriculture is the acute manpower shortage. "Six

hundred streetcleaners could clean up Prague in less than three weeks," a Czech journalist told me. "But we don't have six hundred men to spare for the job, and if we did, the government could not afford to spend so much money on a mere cleaning operation." The government does not have the skilled workers available to build new machinery or even to build new factories to house old machinery. This despite the fact that women work to a degree unheard of in Europe, including the Soviet Union. More than forty-three per cent of the total labor force and thirty-nine per cent of the industrial labor force is made up of women. Nearly half of the agricultural workers are women; in many sectors of the economy, such as transport and services, women workers form the majority. In order to live decently, both husband and wife must work. The abortion rate, the highest in Europe, in 1963 was one for every two births in Bohemia and Moravia and one for every three births in Catholic Slovakia.

The net result of this combination of circumstances ("We are operating within a context of overlapping vicious circles") has been general collapse of morale—especially in the Czech lands—and, specifically, a galloping deterioration of labor discipline. This is the theme of the daily party harangues to the public.

Sixteen years after the great experiment of Communist planning began, all are agreed that it has resulted in an almost unqualified failure. But the debacle in Czechoslovakia is not just another Communist economic failure. In Czechoslovakia, Communism was put to a laboratory test under apparently ideal conditions. In 1948 the party took over an industrial society with one of the most highly skilled labor forces in the world and a plant in generally good condition. To be sure, the Soviets have exploited the country's economy in truly colonialist fashion. But the exploitation could have been intelligent. It was not. The system of exploitation used could have been resisted. It was not. "How could we?" asked a prominent Czech economist rhetorically, "the most

highly industrialized nation in Eastern Europe, have taken the Stalinist system of highly centralized, non-specialized planning which sets the same broad quantitative norms for all fields of production—a system devised to increase radically the basic, heavy industrial plant of a backward nation—how could we have been so stupid as to take such a system and impose it lock, stock, and barrel on our economy? It's incredible."

**F**OR several months now a heated discussion has been in progress between old-line party stalwarts and the great majority of the country's economists over how to retrieve the economy from its present plight. This controversy is a reflection of the controversy in the arts: broadly speaking, the same groups—intellectuals against party hacks at all levels—are involved in both struggles; the basic issue is the same. What is at stake is the concept of economic centralism and hence central control by the party, just as central party direction and control of writers and artists is the nub of the Kafka controversy. The hard core of the party argues in both cases that to do away with centralism is to abandon socialism. The intellectuals argue that persistence in central control will inevitably bankrupt the economy in the one case and perpetrate the stagnation of the arts in the other. The ultimate problem, as the economist Oto Sik put it in a recent article here, is how "to incite the economic interest of our own producers"—specifically, how to spur the profit motive but pull up short of the concept of private property.

**T**HE PARTY stalwarts, in doggedly holding the line, have been reduced for the most part to mere exhortation: "Work harder, save more, increase quality." They realize that the economy is drastically over-extended. The government has recently announced its intention to close 162 enterprises before the year is out. It has prepared a vague system of material incentives—bonuses and the like for outstandingly productive and "socially useful" units

and individuals—apparently to be paid out of the money saved from the dismissal of supernumeraries. Finally, it has begun a comprehensive austerity program that includes a considerable readjustment of prices (a ten per cent increase in the price of a number of quality meat and dairy products and fish on February 10, a ten per cent increase of all restaurant prices on April 1), wages, rents (to be raised on October 1 to cover the half-billion-crown deficit between maintenance costs and income from rental), and pensions (a general reduction). Also, the free distribution of school supplies will cease on July 1, and the distribution of free medicine sometime this year. These measures amount to a fairly drastic reduction of the state's social-welfare overhead, the more painful to the public for its coming all at once—a massive blow that could easily have been avoided if the party-state had come alive to its problems seven years ago.

Even these correctives are not nearly drastic enough to effect the desired change. Not hundreds but literally thousands of enterprises are in effect working against the economy. What is called for as a start in the right direction is the massive dismantling and scrapping of obsolete and irrelevant plant. What is then needed is a basic recasting of the economy so that factories will be able to shift quickly into mass production of highly specialized goods to meet the changing consumer demands in a modern industrial society. This need is particularly pressing in view of the Common Market's scheduled fixing of united trade policies in 1965. At that time all bilateral trade arrangements between members of the Market and Eastern-bloc countries will be renegotiated. If Czechoslovakia is not then in a position to meet the Market's specified needs, it will lose out.

#### **A Warning from Comrade Ulbricht**

In its search for a solution, the party has sent numerous delegations to Yugoslavia to study the system of workers' councils and, more important, the limited system of free enterprise that the Yugoslavs have

gradually extended over the years (a private firm may now employ up to ten men). But these explorations are being made gingerly. The party has apparently no intention of adopting many of the Yugoslav innovations in Czechoslovakia.

So far, the most revolutionary step that the government has reluctantly taken is the campaign to attract foreign tourists on a mass scale. This development has necessitated the abolition or relaxation of a whole series of restrictions affecting Czechs as well as foreigners. Since foreign tourists are now allowed to come in, some local tourists must be allowed to go out. Here, despite severe currency restrictions and strict group-tour arrangements, the government must and does accept the inevitability of a certain amount of defection of Czech tourists. Out of approximately two hundred Czech visitors at the Olympic Winter Games in Innsbruck, eleven asked for asylum. Over the Easter weekend, three out of a busload of some forty Czechs decided to stay in the West. In both directions of the tourist flow, the régime has exposed itself to comparisons at a time when the economic situation of the country is bound to get worse. But the risk had to be taken; Czechoslovakia is in dire need of foreign exchange. Tourism is also another way to lay the foundations for better relations with the West with a view to receiving long-term credits—that is, as a means of inducing the West to finance the salvaging of the system. These credits must come primarily from America and West Germany. As regards America, this entails a restoration of most-favored-nation status and an abrogation of the strategic embargo. But West Germany is a very special case.

Last fall it was generally expected that a trade agreement involving the reciprocal establishment of official trade missions between Germany and Czechoslovakia was imminent. In October the Czechs even arranged an interview with President Antonin Novotny for the West German magazine *Der Stern*, in which he came out strongly for better relations and, specifically, more trade. Then something happened. Negotiations have been on ice ever since. The Kafka contro-

versy may be the cause. In their sharp rejection of the Kafka movement and all its implications, the East German central committee also warned the other satellites against the establishment of official trade relations with West Germany. The warning came late for all except Czechoslovakia. Until the Kafka congress, Prague had been the one source of satellite support for the purely Stalinist régime of Walter Ulbricht. The assumption in Prague is that the East German régime, alarmed at the prospect of encirclement by the West German trade drive in the satellites and by the omens of the Kafka congress, intervened with the Czechs to stop negotiations with the West Germans.

"If you think that the economy is in a mess," one Communist told me, "the party is in a much worse mess. It's a circus." The supreme irony in Prague and Pilsen was this: by far the dirtiest premises were the offices of the political agitation centers. In one, located on a main street of Prague, through cracked windows that had not been washed for perhaps a year, I made out an interior covered with dust against a backdrop of frayed red curtains filthy with accumulated dirt. In the center of the window display sagged a large fly-blown poster yellow with age. "Citizens!" it read, "Do not throw refuse on the ground. Keep our cities and communities clean!" I mentioned the spectacle of the political centers to every party member I met thereafter. Said one: "They are all more or less like that."

#### Czechs, Slovaks, and Cacistocrats

The two words I heard most often in political discussion were "dilettantes" and "bunglers." In the sixteen years the Communists have been in power, they have created their own cacistocracy—the rule of the worst—and have produced collective squalor. The party demands that its leaders come from a working-class background in the strictest sense of the term. (A former chairman of the Slovakian Communist Party was a tailor, another chairman was a shoemaker. "Now the one might have

been a very good tailor and the other was probably a good shoemaker," said a local party secretary, "but they were both lousy chairmen.") "Obedience, blind and absolute," is another prerequisite, and a system of political commissars dictates the primacy of political control at all times and all levels. "A factory manager," a local party secretary complained, "has to contend continuously with the local factory party leader, who may be a simple worker and a dumb one at that. There is the same friction between the government and the party."

The politically active members of the party now favor radical change. However, certain members of the top leadership firmly opposed to any such change have the backing of the politically indifferent membership and the opportunists—the "loyal incompetents" spread throughout the middle echelons of factory management and planning who stand to lose their jobs in any meaningful reorganization. The spearhead of opposition to the present policies is, as usual, the Academy of Sciences.

DE-STALINIZATION was slow to reach Czechoslovakia. More than five years after Khrushchev's Twentieth Party Congress speech in 1956—long after their Polish and Hungarian neighbors had tumultuously and more or less thoroughly de-Stalinized—the Czech Communists began making the first cautious moves toward cleaning out their own Augean stables, and then only under Soviet pressure. There were compelling reasons for this reluctance: unlike any other Communist country, Czechoslovakia is a dual-nation state. There are striking differences between Czechs and Slovaks in language, history, culture, and temperament, and the Stalinist purge in Czechoslovakia was conducted largely along discriminatory, nationalist lines. During the Second World War the Czech lands were included in the Third Reich as a protectorate; Slovakia was a so-called autonomous state. More important, while the Czechs were effectively forced to

war machine, the Slovaks made use of their special situation and highly suitable terrain to mount a considerable partisan movement under Communist leadership. The Slovaks claim to have had a hundred thousand men under arms in the mountains in 1944. In short, the Slovaks possess a partisan tradition, while the Czechs have the tradition of obedience under the boot, a tradition hardly the less onerous for being historically and geographically understandable.

When the Soviet Army finally "liberated" most of Czechoslovakia in 1945, it brought with it the cadre of the Czech Communist Party from its exile in Russia. The friction between the old Communist exiles centered in Prague and the young Communist partisans headquartered in the Slovak capital, Bratislava, began immediately. When the purging season came, the Czechs condemned the Slovak Communist leaders on charges of "bourgeois nationalism." With their recent rehabilitation and the party's admission that the charges against them were trumped up, the Slovak cause has become identified with the general campaign for reform. Also, the Slovak drive for equality (not autonomy) and the general drive against artistic, economic, and administrative centralized control thus neatly coincide, since the center under attack in both cases is Prague.

Under increasing pressure from the intellectuals, the régime first jettisoned Karol Bacilek, first secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, and then last September Premier Viliam Siroky and his clique. Siroky was replaced by a Slovak, Jozef Lenart, who is generally regarded as a liberal. President Novotny, who is also first secretary of the party, is regarded as the chief holdover from the Stalinist days, and de-Stalinization cannot be considered complete until he departs.

The recent establishment of ideological commissions to improve and intensify "party guidance" of chief editors and editorial boards has so far had no visible effects. The cacis-

with the intellectuals outside the confines of party organization. Coercion having been outlawed, at least for a time, the only effective weapon remaining to the leadership is administrative control. The leadership can and does restrict publication of intellectuals' magazines, newspapers, and books by pleading paper shortages. The embargo against all non-Communist publications from abroad is still rigorously enforced. And, of course, the régime still controls appointments and can prevent individual intellectuals from visiting ideological danger spots abroad. (Apparently, the Soviet Union has also declared Paris "off limits" to its writers: over last winter not one Soviet writer—as distinct from cultural functionaries—visited Paris.) It is more difficult to restrict travel within the bloc without openly declaring a state of hostilities: the Czech critic Antonín Liehm scooted down to Budapest in January and came back with an interview supporting complete freedom of expression from the grand old man of Marxist letters, George Lukacs (during his imprisonment with Imre Nagy, Lukacs had decided that Kafka's *The Trial* is a realistic novel).

#### **From Rohliki to Goulash**

In some ways the party has been strengthened by the revolt; it might not even have survived without it. Avowedly, the intellectuals are trying desperately to rehabilitate Marxism, to develop a philosophical product that makes sense. They regard their attempt as the only means of countering a precipitate, general loss of faith—a loss that is most con-

spicuous among the youth of the country.

"Every one of the young people I know in the theatre," a director told me, "is violently anti-Communist—and often enough for the wrong reasons." There is vague hope, and more often mere resignation to the idea that some form of socialism can be worked out. A good many writers would like to be Marxists; a good many more would like not to have been Marxists in vain. In Marxist terms, there is an interrelationship between a society's economic base and its cultural superstructure—between the factory and the theatre. The Czechs have discovered from experience that they do not know what this connection is. Whatever it is, the writers demand relative autonomy. They suspect that the best way to make the connection between the economic base and the cultural superstructure active is to do the work the superstructure demands.

THE INTELLECTUALS are rushing to compare notes with anybody who has notes to compare. I joined a company of Slovaks at eleven o'clock on a Friday morning and finally managed to take my leave at seven o'clock Saturday morning, after twenty hours of marathon wassail and the most intensive question-and-answer period I have ever experienced. There was a break at one point when the cook came out to meet the American. "Will you be here tomorrow?" he asked. I replied that my visa would expire then. "Too bad," he said. "If you were here tomorrow, I'd cook you a goulash so good that you'd ask for asylum in Slovakia."

## RETRENCHMENT FOR NORTH KOREA IN 1964

### Korean Economic Performance 1962-63

The North Korean economy continued to expand at a rapid rate during 1962, largely because of a persistent high rate of industrial growth. The value of gross industrial output increased about 20 percent above that in 1961. With aid from the Soviet Bloc, the regime has taken advantage of North Korea's extensive natural resources to build up an industrial sector that is far more advanced than that of any other small country in Asia. Substantial gains were made in all sectors of industry in 1962, ranging from 5 percent in cement to 37 percent in textiles, although planned increases in the important steel and coal industries were not achieved. Industrial activity declined during the last half of the year because of poor economic administration in heavy industry and serious misallocations of manpower throughout the economy.

Agriculture in North Korea has proved to be intractable because of the low priority that it has received, and it continued to give the regime trouble in 1962. Output in agriculture barely kept abreast of the increase in population, as the all-important grain harvest increased only 3 percent compared with 1961. Grain continued to be rationed. Living conditions improved slightly in 1962 for North Korea's 11 million people because nearly 4 million square meters of new housing were constructed and because production of textile goods was increased. Although output of all types of consumer goods may have increased about 18 percent in 1962, as claimed by the regime, the demand for all categories of consumer goods in North Korea remains far from being satisfied.

In spite of the generally favorable results shown by the North Korean economy during 1962, preliminary plans for 1963 called for a reduced rate of growth in industrial production -- only 11 percent compared with planned increases of 14 percent and 26 percent, respectively, for 1961 and 1962. Industrial difficulties that were encountered late in the year, particularly in the metals and mining industries, appeared to be serious enough for the regime to emphasize the need for more efficient planning, improved maintenance of machinery and equipment, and economy in the use of men and materials in 1963. Agricultural prospects for 1963 were poor, particularly because of a planned transfer of 184,500 hectares of dry field crops to cultivation of paddy and dry field rice, a transfer that could result in a net decline in output because of the short growing season and unreliable rainfall. Long-standing promises by the regime to improve substantially the living conditions of workers and peasants were officially postponed to 1964-65.

Long-term prospects for the North Korean economy are clouded by the implications of the rift between Communist China and the USSR. A break with the Soviet Bloc would reduce considerably the rate of growth of the North Korean economy, even assuming a vigorous effort by Communist China to fill the trade and aid gap thus created. North Korea has become highly dependent on Soviet technology and trade. The position of the Soviet Bloc as the primary source of supply of technical advisers, new machinery and equipment, petroleum products, and spare parts for industry and the military forces is of particular importance. Although Communist China would be an adequate source of supply for consumer goods and most raw materials, North Korean heavy industry is dependent on the USSR for essential replacement parts and new machinery and equipment. The North Korean leadership is well aware that the success of the Seven Year Plan is dependent on future imports and technical assistance from the Soviet Bloc.

The North Korean economic plan for 1962 was built around the objective of "conquering the six heights of production": 5 million tons\* of grain, 250 million meters of textile goods, 800,000 tons of marine products, the construction of 200,000 houses, 1.2 million tons of steel, and 15 million tons of coal. Aside from these six prime goals, the regime announced few concrete production targets and stated that all sectors of the economy would be mobilized to support the attainment of the "six heights." Each of the "six heights" (with the exception of production of grain) represented a substantial increase in planned output above the levels of production claimed for 1961:

	Unit	1961 Claim	1962 Plan
Grain	Million metric tons	4.83	5.00
Textiles	Million linear meters	187	250
Marine products	Thousand metric tons	590	800
Housing	Million square meters	2.2	6.1
Crude steel	Thousand metric tons	776	1,200
Coal	Million metric tons	11.8	15

In early January 1963 the regime announced that the housing, steel, and coal heights had not been conquered.

The decision to make the "conquest of the six heights" the basic task of the economic plan for 1962 is directly related to the long-term goals of the current Seven Year Plan (1961-67). In his report to the fourth Congress of the Korean Workers Party on the Seven Year Plan in September 1961, Kim Il-song emphasized that "For the first three years of the Seven Year Plan [that is, 1961-63] efforts should be concentrated on the improvement of

\*Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this paper.

the welfare of the working people....," thus postponing further rapid industrialization until the latter part of the plan period. The attainment of the "six heights" -- four of which (grain, fish, textiles, and housing) are essentially consumer goods -- was intended to make 1962 "a decisive year" in the improvement of living conditions. A shift to production of more consumer goods in 1961-63 was desirable from the propaganda point of view, but the regime also recognized the need to raise the very low levels of living endured by the public since the end of the Korean War.

In 1961, the first year of the proposed 3-year, consumer-oriented phase of the Seven Year Plan, some progress apparently was made in raising levels of living. In 1962, however, the rate of output of consumer goods was about 10 percentage points below planned levels, and Kim Il-song indicated at the end of the year that the fulfillment of the consumer-oriented phase of the Seven Year Plan would be deferred to 1964-65. The following official statistics reflect the shortfall in output of consumer goods in 1962 and a planned shift of emphasis to capital goods in 1963:

Annual Percentage Increase in the Value of Gross Industrial Output		
	<u>Capital Goods</u>	<u>Consumer Goods</u>
1960 claim	15	10
1961 claim	9	21
1962 plan	24	28
1962 claim	21	18
1963 plan	13	8

The regime abandoned its promise to improve living conditions greatly by the end of 1963, and the economic plan for 1963 set only moderate goals for grain, marine products, textiles, and housing construction that are equal to or slightly above the claimed levels of 1962.

The economy of North Korea continued its steady growth during 1962, although for the first time since the end of the Korean War the North Koreans failed to fulfill their annual economic plan. The announced increase for 1962 in the value of gross industrial output of 20 percent was below the planned figure of 25.6 percent, but it was higher than the increase of 14 percent in 1961 and slightly above the planned average annual rate of increase of 18 percent for the Seven Year Plan.

A substantial rate of economic growth in 1962 was accompanied by developing stresses in the economy, caused by poor planning and the over-extension of limited material and manpower reserves.

The regime tends to soft-pedal the fact that the "six heights" were not conquered in 1962. The year-end report of the Central Statistical Bureau admits to the failure in the accomplishment of three of these six prime goals: output of coal, output of steel, and housing construction. The failure to achieve planned levels of production in the key ferrous metals and mining industries is more a result of overambitious and unrealistic planning by the Heavy Industry Commission than of serious difficulties within the industries. Although output of coal and crude steel fell short of plan, production increased 12 percent and 35 percent, respectively, above the levels of 1961. In housing construction the regime admits to missing its goal of 200,000 units by only 19,700 units. It is believed, however, that this claim is still greatly exaggerated.

Of the remaining "three heights" -- grain, marine products, and textiles -- the regime claimed fulfillment of the target of 5 million tons of grain and overfulfillment of the goals of 800,000 tons of marine products and 250 million meters of textiles. The announced figure for production of grain (5 million tons) is grossly exaggerated, as have been the regime's grain figures since at least 1958. The figure for textile production (256 million meters) probably is correct, but the very poor quality of much of the output detracts from the achievement. Heavy investment in new boats and equipment for the fishing industry in 1961-62 tends to support the claim of a marine products catch of 840,000 tons.

North Korea announced few firm goals to be attained in 1963. According to Kim Il-song, "the basic direction of the national economic development plan for 1963 will be towards maintaining and consolidating the 'six heights'..., and carrying out thorough preparations to wage a new battle," presumably in 1964. He stated further that overambitious planning must be avoided and that the industrial rate of growth will be kept within the limits of the nation's capabilities. The Premier indirectly stated two main reasons for retrenchment in 1963 in his New Year's address, by urging the solution of the "weighty" problem of labor administration and by condemning inefficiency and waste in the state capital construction program.

Industrial goals for 1963, stated mostly in general terms, gave top priority to the mining of ferrous and nonferrous ores and of coal. Also slated to receive special attention were the electric power industry and the ferrous metals industry. The chemical and machine building industries were to concentrate on support to light industry and agriculture through production of

chemical fibers, chemical fertilizer, and farm machinery. In light industry the goal for textiles remained at 250 million meters, the former goal of 300 million meters in 1963 being postponed to 1964. The development of local industries again urged for 1963, but it is believed that state assistance to small inefficient producers was cut back. Special stress was placed on the more efficient use of existing facilities in all sectors of the economy.

In agriculture the target for production of grain in 1963 once again was 5 million tons. However, Kim Man-kum, Chairman of the North Korean Agricultural Commission, stated that dry fields under rice cultivation would be expanded by 150,000 hectares and that paddy rice acreage would be increased by 34,500 hectares to a total of more than 575,000 hectares. This move reflected longstanding consumer dissatisfaction with the high proportion of corn products in the individual grain ration. Agricultural workers were informed that 1963 was to be a preparatory year for production of 3 million tons of rice and 200,000 tons of meat in 1964. Increased mechanization, irrigation, and production of chemical fertilizer were deemed essential to the successful completion of these tasks.

Retrenchment - 1964. A change in the direction of the economic development plan of North Korea for 1964 announced early in the fall of 1963 by planning chief Chong Chun-taek -- from emphasis on expansion in heavy industry to production of consumer goods and support of agriculture and export industries -- greatly diminishes the possibility that the regime will fulfill the over-all goals of its ambitious Seven Year Plan (1961-67). Although the rate of economic growth will slacken in 1964, this retrenchment is not indicative of any basic instability in the North Korean economy, and it is likely that the reduced goals of the economic plan for 1964 will be met. This shift in economic priorities, which came at the end of a year marked by apparent indecision in economic planning and a reduction in the rate of industrial growth, reflected continuing problems in the allocation of material and manpower resources and doubts in P'yongyang concerning either the desirability or the reliability of the USSR and the European Satellites as key sources of trade and aid for future economic development. The change in priorities in the 1964 plan indicates that North Korea intends to become less dependent on the USSR for industrial imports and for economic assistance. It is doubtful that Communist China could supplant the USSR immediately as a supplier of North Korean industrial imports, and several years would be required before any other sources of such imports could be developed.

According to Kim Il-song, "the core of the 1964 plan will lie in consolidating the foundation of a self-sufficient economy which has been laid, utilizing it more legitimately, and increasing consumer goods production on a large scale...."

Table

North Korea: Claimed Production of Major Products  
1962 and Plans for 1964 and 1967

<u>Category and Commodity</u>	<u>Unit of Measure</u>	<u>1962 Claim</u>	<u>1964 Plan</u>	<u>1967 Plan</u>
Electric power	Billion kilowatt-hours	11.44	10.72	17
Iron ore	Million metric tons	3.34	4	7.2
Pig iron and sponge iron	Thousand metric tons	1,213	1,270	2,300
Finished steel	Thousand metric tons	633	870	1,700
Metalcutting machines	Units	3,360	3,200	7,500
Cement	Million metric tons	2.38	2.78	4.30
Flat glass	Million square meters	5.54	5	10
Tractors	Thousand units	2.50	4.2	17.1
Chemical fertilizers	Thousand metric tons	779	950	1,700
Textiles	Million linear meters	256	300	500
Footwear	Million pairs	24	37	41
Sewing machines	Thousand units	31	82	123
Bicycles	Thousand units	32	70	150
Grain	Million metric tons	5	5	6.6
Marine products	Thousand metric tons	840	800	1,200

The prime objectives of the plan are (a) to expand the output of consumer goods; (b) to develop mining and forestry in order to "build raw material bases"; and (c) to improve agricultural production by increasing the proportion of rice in the total grain harvest, by increasing meat production, and by expanding the output of commercial crops. A comparison of the claimed output of important industrial, consumer, and agricultural products in 1962 with planned production for 1964 and 1967 (the final year of the Seven Year Plan) is given in the table.

Industry. As indicated in the table, some of the essential industries that are in need of foreign assistance from the Soviet Bloc in order to bring capacity up to the levels contemplated by the final year of the Seven Year Plan (electric power, iron and steel, machine building, and construction materials) are to remain at about the same level in 1964 as in 1962, and some are to produce even less in 1964 than the claimed output of 1962. Production of consumer goods (textiles, footwear, sewing machines, and bicycles) is to register impressive percentage gains in 1964 compared with 1962, but the impact of these increased supplies on the prevailing low levels of living of North Korea's 11 million people will be negligible. The practice, started in mid-1963, of producing consumer goods in large, centrally controlled factories such as the Huichon machine tool plant and the Hwanghae iron works in order to supplement the output of small local factories is necessary to insure the higher production targets for 1964 and probably will help to improve the generally poor quality of North Korean consumer goods.

The mining of coal and metallic ores again will be emphasized in 1964, and an expansion of smelting facilities also is planned. Anthracite coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, and precious metals are important export items for North Korea in trade with both Communist and Free World countries.

Agriculture. In 1964 the North Korean regime plans to expand the output of rice by an unspecified amount. Total production of grain is to be maintained at 5 million metric tons -- an unimaginative goal by Communist standards, considering that P'yongyang claims to have produced as much as 4.8 million metric tons of grain in 1961. In December 1962, when the regime proclaimed that 1963 would be a year to consolidate past economic achievements and prepare for rapid economic growth in the future, goals of 3 million metric tons of rice and 200,000 tons of meat products were set for 1964. These goals were not restated in the recently published economic plan for 1964 -- no absolute figure for rice production was given and the target for meat was dropped to 130,000 tons -- and it is assumed that agricultural plans for 1963, in particular the expansion of acreage for dry field rice, have not been carried out successfully. Although in 1963 the growing season has been better than usual and although the regime has made progress in improving

the irrigation system and increasing the supply of chemical fertilizers, it is believed that poor planning and administration precludes any large gains in agricultural production in 1963 and probably in 1964. Commercial crops (tobacco, cotton, flax, hemp, and fruit) will be emphasized in 1964 in order to earn foreign exchange and to provide raw materials for light industry.

Problems and Prospects. The problems that have brought about the decision to slow the pace of economic development in 1964 are (a) continuing industrial bottlenecks, dating from late 1962, caused by poor planning and administration and inefficiency in the allocation of material and manpower resources, and (b) planning difficulties stemming from a basic change in relationships with the USSR and the European Satellites.

Industrial Problems. Some sectors of heavy industry have been especially unresponsive to administrative reforms advanced by the North Korean regime. The reorganization of the Heavy Industry Commission into separate ministries in September 1962 apparently did not improve the planning and administrative performance of individual mines and factories. In spite of increased investment in the mining industry in 1963, amounting to 21 percent above the previous year, it is unlikely that output of coal in 1963 will reach the goal of 15 million tons originally set for 1962. Similarly the establishment of a State Construction Commission early in 1963 to control the assignment of men and materials to local construction projects has not yet produced the desired results. Important construction projects such as the P'yongyang Thermal Powerplant and the rolling mill of the Nampo Smelter continue to lag behind schedule. A lack of standardized plans, blueprints, and construction materials has been an important factor in retarding progress on construction sites.

Labor Shortages. One of the most serious domestic problems in North Korea is a deficiency of trained labor. Continuous industrialization, rapid expansion of the economy, and maintenance of a large standing army have strained North Korea's available manpower resources to the limit. In particular, the agricultural labor force has been seriously depleted in recent years because of a continual migration of workers to the cities. The regime's latest strategy apparently has been to "recruit" students into the working population. According to official statistics, total school enrollment decreased by 90,000 students -- from 2.64 million to 2.55 million -- between the end of 1962 and September 1963. This drop in school enrollment is the first recorded since the Korean War. It is likely that most of these former students have been directed into the agricultural labor force. It was recently announced that in 1964 the regime will "assign over 20,000 units of manpower, including new graduates of schools of various levels, to rural communities." Although this move may benefit agricultural

production, the industrial labor force will continue to be short-handed, especially in terms of technicians, skilled workers, and managers.

Prospects. Prospects for sustaining economic growth in 1964 and beyond depend on the regime's ability to remedy industrial bottlenecks and to adjust short-run and long-term planning to an anticipated decline in the level of economic support from the USSR. If the regime fulfills its promise to expand production of consumer goods and to improve living conditions, the decision to slow the development of heavy industry will be cheerfully accepted by North Korea's long-suffering workers and peasants.

North Korea's drive to become the "Czechoslovakia of the Far East" will falter without continuing support from the USSR and the European Satellites in providing new machinery and equipment, technical assistance, and spare parts for heavy industry -- in particular for the key machine building, chemical, and iron and steel industries. Communist China has supplied no appreciable support to North Korean heavy industry in the past and is believed to be incapable of filling this gap in the near future. Several years would be required for North Korea to develop alternate sources of items now supplied by the USSR by importing from Japan or other non-Bloc countries.

Forced Unity in Communist China

Daily communications from the China Mainland tell the world that all of the Chinese leaders and all of the Chinese people hear with the same pair of ears, see with the same eyes and think with the same mind: youths, intellectuals, soldiers, Communist cadres, ethnic minorities, peasants and industrial workers -- all are said to be solidly united to fulfill whatever demands are made of them by the central government. However, a careful examination of the Chinese government's own statements makes clear that Mao's China is not as monolithic as its Communist leaders would have the world believe.

Sino-Soviet Dispute: Chicom authorities are particularly anxious to demonstrate their complete unity on the question of the Sino-Soviet rift and yet there are numerous indications that this is not the case. The joint Red Flag-People's Daily editorial of September 6, 1963 accused Khrushchev of "undisguised support for anti-Party elements in the Chinese Communist Party." The outright admission of disagreement within the Chinese Communist Party in the reference to "anti-Party elements," is made public only because it is necessary to substantiate their own charges of Khrushchev's sins.

Chicom Unity on Military Matters: Beginning in 1958 there were frequent references to problems within the military establishment and also between some military men and the Communist Party concerning Mao Tse-tung's thesis that "weapons are an important factor in war but not the decisive one; it is man and not material that is decisive." On July 31, 1958 Chu Teh, Chairman of the National People's Congress, complained about "tendencies toward an exclusively military point of view," and subsequent articles in the Chicom press made it clear that Chu Teh was rebuking professional military men for objecting to political direction of the armed forces. Military leaders had also criticized the diversion of the armed forces' manpower and physical resources away from military preparedness and toward economic construction and political-ideological orientation and study. The removal of several high-ranking military officials in 1958 and 1959, among them Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai and Chief of Staff Su Yu, provides convincing evidence of the high level as well as the extent of the opposition to Mao's views on this basic question.

The Great Leap Forward: Statements by Chicom leaders themselves also make clear that there was considerable opposition within the Chinese Communist Party to the Great Leap Forward of 1958, the extremist and unrealistic program designed to make Communist China an advanced industrial power in the shortest possible time. Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic and Mao's designated successor, launched the Great Leap Forward in a speech to the second session of the 8th Chinese Communist Party Congress (May 1958) in which he criticized "some

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contrasts with the rightist ideas as "keeping to the right is better than keeping to the left" or "it's better to go slower than faster." Liu referred to the "struggle between the two methods" which he said was resolved only by "the rectification campaign and the anti-rightist struggle." Even later there were critical references to "harvest-watchers," people who had deep reservations about the practicality of the Great Leap Forward and who said let's wait until harvest time to find out if the idea is practical or not.

By August 1959 it was becoming increasingly clear that the Great Leap Forward was grossly impractical and would fail. The 16 August 1959 Lushan Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee said that "right opportunist sentiments among some unstable elements" were responsible for the troubles and must be "smashed." The communique issued after the plenum also referred to the "emergence of right opportunists who underestimate the great achievements of the leap-forward movement.... The Plenary enjoins Party Committees at all levels to overcome erroneous right opportunist ideas." The phrase "at all levels" indicated that "right opportunists" were not limited merely to the lower, non-policy-making level. Also, it was during this period that Chen Yun, Vice Premier of the State Council and China's top economist and planning official, was removed from positions of authority. It is considered likely that he opposed the Great Leap Forward. He has not been rehabilitated to this date.

Intellectuals and 100 Flowers: In 1956 the Chicom leaders mistakenly calculated that they could allow the open airing of grievances and that the regime's popularity would be upheld. Chicom Party authorities were stunned by the nature and extent of the criticisms and denunciations that gushed forth, particularly from intellectuals. The "blooming and contending" period was ended almost as quickly as it had started and an "anti-rightist" purge was inaugurated to "rectify the dissidents," to persuade the intellectuals that they should be "both Red and expert" in their chosen fields. The ensuing "rectification" campaign further embittered the Chinese intellectuals: not only was the limited freedom of thought and discussion abruptly repressed, but Chicom authorities set about persecuting intellectuals who had spoken out only after being assured by the authorities that they would never be punished for speaking their minds.

Disaffection among Youths. Alienation and disaffection among young people are officially recognized in the current extensive Chinese Communist campaign to instill revolutionary zeal in youth groups. Demands for production and agricultural increases have been met by reducing educational investments and restricting educational opportunities for youth. In addition to depriving many young people of an education, this action has increased competition for the better jobs. China's stagnant economy is unable to absorb the large number of young people who are added to the labor force each year. Efforts to solve the problem by sending young people to the countryside or remote frontier areas are extremely unpopular and cause further resentment among youths. Urban youths, repelled by the low pay and

hardships of rural and frontier life, have found ways to dodge these assignments. These unemployed youths, many of whom have turned to thievery and black-marketeering, have apparently become a serious social problem in Shanghai, Canton and other large cities.

Regime Treatment of Workers and Peasants: There is little doubt that peasant disaffection with the communes was a critical factor in the dismal failure of the agricultural aspect of the Great Leap Forward as well as one of the main reasons for the Chicom regime's decision to abandon or at least modify the more unpopular features of the program. There are indications that anti-government resentment still flares up in spite of the government's efforts to mollify the peasants. Recently, a group of peasants who had been assembled to see a propaganda play about the current "class struggle in the countryside" campaign rose up in protest and threw stones at the bewildered actors on the stage.

And now industrial workers are to be subjected to extreme measures to solve production and social-control problems. The program formulated at a national conference in Peking from March 16 to April 3 imposes military discipline on industrial workers to spur production and insure obedience. Political departments have been formed in 15 government ministries to carry out a new directive of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Under the slogan "Learn from the People's Liberation Army," the program calls for labor organization and political indoctrination like that used in the Chinese Armed Forces. Industrial cadres will be sent to army schools to study the army's methods. The People's Daily, official newspaper of the CCP, describes this program as "a new development of the thought of Mao Tse-tung on socialist construction, a new creation regarding the construction and management of modern enterprises, and the fundamental question of the orientation of China's socialist construction." As usual, the Chinese press says the new program will speed the development of the economy and assist in the struggle against the West and the "modern revisionists" of the CPSU.

Succession to Mao: The men who assist Mao in ruling Communist China are all first generation, old guard party revolutionaries who have been in the Party at least 30 years, served together as political commissars or military commanders during the wars against Japan and against the Nationalist government. Mao's designated successor is Liu Shao-chi and there is no evidence that a struggle for Mao's role is taking place at this time. Even so, the mere removal of his unifying influence could provoke drastic changes and create succession problems for the survivors. There are too many unknowns in the formula to permit accurate or precise analysis about what will happen when Mao dies. In any case, all of the elements are present for a massive power struggle and in many ways the situation in China today is like it was in Russia some 40 years ago when Lenin's illness forced him to let power slip from his hands. At that time there was little public indication of dissension among the old Bolsheviks who had

served Lenin for so long. We know now that there was a vicious battle for power taking place that would end in death and disgrace for the losing candidates. Again 10 years ago, Stalin's successors gathered around his coffin to proclaim their solidarity and vow continuity for his policies. A few short years later, the current Soviet leadership had ousted an "anti-Party group" and was astounding the world by exposing Stalin's criminal brutality and senile incompetence.

EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS IN AFRICA

"A tremendous role in disseminating the idea of Marxism on the African continent belongs to the Communist parties of the metropolises."

Afrika 1956-1961, Moscow, 1962

Communists from Western European parties have been especially active in Africa since World War II in recruiting and training students, supporting or penetrating communications media and acting as advisors to new governments. Their actions are usually contrary to the policies of their own countries, often conflict with African aspirations for true independence and non-alignment but are almost always advantageous to the Soviet Union. Examples below are typical of African activity directed from Europe.

The French Communist Party (FCP) hoped to gain power in France during the post-war period by capitalizing on their popularity -- falsely achieved -- as leaders of large scale anti-Nazi resistance. Anxious to assure continuing dominion over the French African empire for a future Communist regime, they did not support nascent African nationalist movements until their own Party's failure to win at the polls and French government negotiations on African independence forced their hand. FCP failure to support African independence efforts led to several defections including Jacques-Mansour Verges who recently declared in his Chicom-sponsored monthly Revolution, that the FCP was the "watchdog of the French colonial empire...in the years following World War II." As watchdog of empire, the FCP did not permit the Algerian CP, which they directed, to join the Algerian revolution until 1956, two years after it began.

Individual French Communists have held influential positions in Africa. Charles Oscar Bettelheim, Economics Professor at Paris University and well known for his Marxist views, worked on Mali's economic five-year plan and acted as economics advisor to the government of Guinea. Jean Seuret-Canale, at one time secretary of the FCP's Federation in the department of Mayenne, directed a normal school in Guinea.

In Madagascar in 1946, the FCP organized a Communist study group, Groupe d'Etudes Communistes. Leaders trained by the group formed the pro-Soviet Union des Peuples Malgaches which became the dominating influence in a grouping of nationalist parties known as the AKFM, now opposing the government of the independent Malagasy Republic. Graduates of the study group also became the cadres of the AKFM's front organizations. Pierre Boiteau, one of the founders and an official of the Communist-dominated French Confederation General de Travail, is still in touch with the Malagasy group, having visited Tananarive as recently as April 1964.

One of the most useful instruments for furthering Soviet African policies has been the Federation des Etudiants d'Afrique Noir en France (FEANF) through which the FCP contacts and influences African students while they are studying in France. Sometimes the students are persuaded to continue their education in Bloc countries where they may be subjected to thorough political indoctrination and perhaps recruited for political or paramilitary tasks on their return to Africa. Philippe Yace, secretary general of the Ivory Coast Democratic Party, wrote in Fraternité, from Abidjan, that some thirty Ivory Coast students in France studied Soviet revolutionary classics and clandestine organization under the auspices of FEANF.

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) is active in the commonwealth countries. Influential personal advisors to President Nkrumah of Ghana include Geoffrey Bing, former CPGB member who became first attorney general of Ghana and drafted the Ghana constitution. The staff of Ghana's Young Pioneers, which includes Oblitey Commey, formerly of the CPGB. Idris Cox, the CPGB's colonial expert, called on Nkrumah and the youth Institute staff in late 1963 to offer assistance for ideological training of Ghana's Convention Peoples Party cadres. The CPGB may provide another lecturer for the Institute.

David Grove, interpreter of Ghanaian "National Democracy," according to his article in the November issue of the CPGB journal, Marxism Today, is a town planner for the Ghanaian government and an instructor at the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Science and Technology.

Jack Woddiss, CPGB member, WFTU official, writer and contributor to Soviet periodicals, directed a course for English-speaking trade unionists in Conakry, Guinea, in late 1962.

One of the most influential Belgian Communists is lawyer Jean Terfve, the party's African affairs expert who is instrumental in contacting and influencing African students and political figures from the former Belgian colonies.

The Italian Communist Party sent a goodwill delegation to Algeria in early 1964 headed by the party Deputy Secretary, Luigi Longo. Received by both Premier Ben Bella and by the Algerian National Liberation Front party, Longo and his delegation offered assistance in carrying out the Front's revolutionary socialist program.

Soviet Position on Neutrality

Excerpts from the Press

From "Soviet 'Non-Interference'" in Les Informations Politiques et Sociales (Paris weekly news service) of 22 April 1964:

"...in Finland, Soviet interference is continuous and particularly heavy....The most spectacular and noteworthy aspect of Soviet interference in Finland is Moscow's permanent veto of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, because of its anti-Communism. Moscow forbids Finland to have a Social Prime Minister. A similar ban exists as regards the Presidency of the Republic, although that position may be less powerful than the Prime Minister in Finland. ...the Soviets insist on maintaining in power pro-Soviet personalities,...who...are...docile toward Moscow...."

From Pravda, Moscow, article by Stepan Smirnov on 6 April 1964:

"...it must be mentioned that such reactionaries as Leskinen have not desisted from trying to damage the good neighbor relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Different social circles in the Soviet Union have been wondering at the fact that lately some representatives of Finnish political life, for example former Prime Minister Sukselainen, have taken part as guests of honor in celebrations arranged in the U.S. and Sweden by Estonian emigrants who are...known for their animosity toward our country. This is scarcely consonant with the policy of friendship with the Soviet Union to which the same Mr. Sukselainen has so often sworn fidelity."

In an article in the same official CPSU paper a month earlier (9 Feb) Smirnov had written:

"...the policy of anti-Soviet adventures...caused...misfortune in Finland. Time is the best teacher and it convincingly proved to the Finns that a completely different policy corresponds to their national interests....And only the few persons who have sunk into ultra-nationalism and hatred for Communism have not desired to learn by history."

From Farnand, Oslo, Norway, editorial of 11 April 1964:

"...Perhaps there are also elements of fear (of the Soviets) present in Norway. The Soviets openly play on the strings of fear. As late as this week: Finland's former Prime Minister, V. Sukselainen received a sharp reprimand from the Kremlin -- via the Soviet Party's main organ, Pravda -- for recently having participated in meetings in the USA and Sweden on behalf of Estonian refugees.

## CUBA AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

On New Year's Day 1959, when Fulgencio Batista abruptly abandoned the soil of Cuba and the office of president, Fidel Castro achieved the greatest world-wide popularity that any Latin American political leader had enjoyed in several generations. As an authentic hero, Castro could count on the nearly unanimous support of his own people and the whole-hearted cooperation of democratic governments elsewhere.

In all too short a time he squandered this immense capital of good will by instituting a policy of bloody reprisals against his political opponents, contrary to Cuban law and in defiance of long-established custom. Today Castro stands condemned before the civilized world and will be long remembered as perhaps the most ruthless despot that America has yet produced.

Atrocities began as soon as the Castro forces took over and continue to this day despite the ugly impression that they have made abroad. Only a few weeks after Castro's triumphant entry into Havana, Time magazine, in its issue of 26 Jan 1959, which "honored" Castro as the man of the week, had this to say:

The executioner's rifle cracked across Cuba last week, and around the world voices hopefully cheering for a new democracy fell still. The men who had just won a popular revolution for old ideals -- for democracy, justice, and honest government -- themselves picked up the arrogant tools of dictatorship.

By the end of that month over 200, according to Castro's own figures, had been tried and executed, not counting the many more who were quietly liquidated in the canefields and prisons. By the middle of March, the figure had passed the 400 mark which Castro himself had earlier set as the probable maximum which it would be necessary to execute, and during that month he seriously proposed capital punishment for embezzlers of government money. (It seems that one of his own official family had accepted a considerable bribe and, said Castro, "We are studying the case in order to execute him.") Before the end of the year, the figure had climbed to 557. (Time Magazine, 28 Dec 1959)

Today, after some five-and-a-half years of terror, estimates of the number of Cubans killed by the Castro regime run into the thousands, the highest being 7,121, and the most credible, 3,351, as of 7 March 1964. Of these, according to a student exile group, 1,161 are identified as having been executed after public trials.

(Continued)

People who are opposed to capital punishment argue that there is something sadistic and extremely cruel about the whole process of apprehension, arraignment, trial, appeal, denial of appeal -- all culminating in the finality of death by deliberate execution. On the other hand, proponents of the extreme penalty reply that this same deliberate, implacable character of justice is the very element that furnishes the deterrent against capital crime.

Seen from this point of view, capital punishment is more cruel than casual homicide or the political murders which other Latin American dictators have committed from time to time over the years. What makes Castro's atrocities especially alarming is that they are being perpetrated in the name of justice and of law. The perpetrators, therefore, need not have any remorse or sense of guilt. They do not have to hide the bodies. This is the difference between a breaker of the law and a subverter of the law. Where dictators have sought to conceal political murder, Castro has institutionalized it; he has legalized the taking of human life for reasons not countenanced anywhere else in the free world. Thus Cuba is the first country outside the Communist bloc to prostitute law and justice in so flagrant and cynical a manner.

One of the devices by which the Castro regime was able to legalize the liquidation of its political enemies was by the application of retroactive justice. The famous "Reglamento No. 1" was adopted by the high command of the Rebel Army in the Sierra Maestra on 21 February 1958. However, it cannot be judged to have had the force of law until Law No. 33 (which gave retroactive force to laws adopted by the Ejercito Rebelde in the Sierra Maestra) was published in the Gaceta Oficial on 2 Feb 1959. Even so, many Cubans were sentenced to die and many more condemned to long prison terms on the basis of that law for alleged crimes committed prior to that date. All this in spite of the fact that it is a universal principle of jurisprudence that no law can be retroactive, a principle that is clearly stated in Article 13 of the Cuban Criminal Code of 1896: "Criminal laws can have no retroactive effect; therefore, no one can be condemned except according to laws or dispositions adopted prior to the commission of the crime."

What has been going on in Cuba contrasts in an astonishing manner with both the de jure and the de facto status of capital punishment elsewhere in the Hemisphere. Despite its traditions of violence in private and public life, Latin America is distinguished among the great culturally homogeneous regions of the world by its almost unanimous repudiation of capital punishment. In only a few countries is it still on the statute books, and in them the tendency is toward de facto abolition.

According to a recent survey made by the United Nations of fourteen Latin American countries that replied to the questionnaire, nine have abolished the death penalty by an explicit constitutional provision or by an article of positive law: Argentina (1922), Brazil (1889), Colombia (1910) Costa Rica (1832), Dominican Republic (1924), Ecuador (1897), Mexico (the Federal District and 25 of 29 states), Uruguay (1907), Venezuela (1863). In five of the countries replying, the death penalty is legal: Cuba (where it has been reinstated by Castro) Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. In the last three, it can be said that capital punishment has been abolished de facto, though not de jure. For example, during a recent five-year period, no death sentence was passed in El Salvador or Guatemala, and none has been carried out in Peru since March, 1953.

Traditionally, Latin American nations have solved their knottiest political problems by violent means -- the military coup, the golpe de estado, the cuartelazo. But in recent years, in spite of dozens of unconstitutional changes of regime, there has been no single instance in which the insurgent government has carried out a policy of inhuman revenge against the personnel of the regime which it overthrew. On occasions there have been a few casualties during the heat of battle, but most of the take overs have been entirely bloodless and without subsequent reprisals.

In the case of the atrocities in Cuba, neutral observers at first thought that the Castroites were seeking limited revenge and that things would settle down to normal after a little initial bloodletting. It is now evident that Castro is following the pattern of Soviet Russia and Communist China by adopting systematic terror as a technique of government. Without this indispensable weapon of the modern police state, Castro and his Communist cronies would soon be overthrown by the Cuban people themselves.